without cannonry and every color trailing in the dust.
And what caused it? The sudden change from victory
to defeat. It was not the want of Generalship,
for General Early had wisely planned. It was
not for lack of courage of the troops, for that morning
they had displayed valor and over come obstacles which
would have baffled and dismayed less bold spirits.
Was it for the superior gallantry of the enemy’s
troops or the superior Generalship of their adversary?
The latter was awry, and the former had been routed
from their entrenchments by the bayonet of the Confederates.
Sheridan did not even hope to stop our victorious march,
only to check it sufficiently to enable him to save
the remnant of his army. A feeble advance, a
panic strikes our army, and all is lost, while no
individual, officer, brigade, or regiment could be
held responsible. It shows that once a panic
strikes an army all discipline is lost and nothing
but time will restore it. For nearly one hundred
years historians have been framing reasons and causes
of Napoleon’s Waterloo, but they are as far
from the real cause to-day as they were the night
of the rout. It will ever remain the same sad
mystery of Early at Cedar Creek. Men are, in
some respects, like the animal, and especially in
large bodies. A man, when left alone to reason
and think for himself, and be forced to depend upon
his own resources, will often act differently than
when one of a great number. The “loss of
a head” is contageous. One will commit a
foolish act, and others will follow, but cannot tell
why. Otherwise quiet and unobtrusive men, when
influenced by the frenzy of an excited mob, will commit
violence which in their better moments their hearts
would revolt and their consciences rebel against.
A soldier in battle will leave his ranks and fly to
the rear with no other reason than that he saw others
doing the same, and followed.
The stampede of Early was uncalled for, unnecessary,
and disgraceful, and I willingly assume my share of
the blame and shame. My only title to fame rests
upon my leading the Third South Carolina Regiment in
the grandest stampede of the Southern Army, the greatest
since Waterloo, and I hope to be forgiven for saying
with pardonable pride that I led them remarkably well
to the rear for a boy of eighteen. A General
could not have done better.
We passed the little towns and villages of the Valley,
the ladies coming to their doors and looking on the
retreat in silence. Were we ashamed? Don’t
ask the pointed question, gentle reader, for the soldiers
felt as if they could turn and brain every Federal
soldier in the army with the butt of his rifle.
But not a reproach, not a murmur from those self-sacrificing,
patriotic women of the Valley. They were silent,
but sad—their experience during the time
the enemy occupied the Valley before told them they
had nothing to expect but insult and injury, for their
bold, proud Virginia blood would not suffer them to
bend the knee in silent submission. Their sons
and husbands had all given themselves to the service
of their country, while rapine and the torch had already
done its work too thoroughly to fear it much now or
dread its consequences. But the presence alone
of a foreign foe on their threshold was the bitterness
of gall.