only to fall in the fort.  Scaling ladders were now called for, but none were at hand.  Anderson had moved up on Wofford’s left, but finding the fort yet uncovered, instead of charging the entrenchment, as ordered, he changed his direction towards the fort, and soon his brigade was tangled in wild confusion with those of Worfford and Humphrey, gazing at the helpless mass of struggling humanity in the great gulf below.

Kershaw’s men stood at extreme tension watching and waiting the result of the struggle around the fort.  Never perhaps were their nerves so strung up as the few moments they awaited in suspense the success or reverse of the assaulting column, bending every effort to catch the first command of “forward.”  All but a handful of the enemy had left the fort, and victory here seemed assured, and in that event the result of Kershaw’s onslaught on the right and Jenkins’ South Carolinians and Benning’s Georgians on the left would have been beyond the range of conjecture.  Just at this supreme moment Major Goggans, of McLaws’ staff, who had been at the fort and took in the worst phases of the situation, rode to General Longstreet and reported the fortress impregnable without axes and scaling ladders.  Under this misapprehension, General Longstreet gave the fatal order for the assaulting columns to retire, and all the support back to their entrenchments.  Thus was one of the most glorious victories of the war lost by the ill judgment of one man.  General Longstreet bitterly regretted giving this order so hastily, but pleads in extinuation his utmost confidence in Major Goggans, his class-mate at West Point.

In the twenty minutes of the assault Longstreet lost in his three brigades, Wofford’s, Humphrey’s, and Anderson’s, eight hundred and twenty-two; Burnside, six hundred and seventy-three.  During the campaign Longstreet lost twelve hundred and ninety-six.  During the campaign Burnside lost fourteen hundred and eighty-one.

Kershaw’s Brigade lost many gallant officers and men during the sanguinary struggles around Knoxville, and it must be confessed in sorrow and regret, all to no purpose.  Not that the commanding general was wanting in ability, military training, or tactical knowledge; nor the soldiers in courage, daring, and self-denials.  None of these were lacking, for the officers and men of the line performed deeds of prowess that have never been excelled by any soldiers on the planet, while in skill or fearlessness the regimental brigade and division commanders were equal to Ney, Murat, St. Cyr, or any of the host of great commanders of the Napoleonic era.  But in the first place the Confederate forces were too weak, poorly equipped in all those essentials that are so requisite to an invading army.

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MAJOR WILLIAM M. GIST.