marches and the sun’s burning rays from the time of our crossing into Maryland till now, were not up at the battle of the 17th, thus weakening the ranks of Lee to nearly one-half their real strength, taking those on detached service into consideration also.  But these had all come up and joined their ranks as we began crossing the Potomac.  None wished to be left behind; even men so badly wounded that at home they would be confined to their beds marched one hundred miles in the killing heat.  Hundreds of men with their arms amputated left the operating table to take up their long march.  Some shot through the head, body, or limbs preferred to place the Potomac between themselves and the enemy.

Lee entered Maryland with sixty-one thousand men all told, counting Quartermaster and Commissary Departments, the teamsters, and those in the Medical and Engineer Department.  Lee lost thirteen thousand six hundred and eighty-seven men killed and wounded on the field of battle, and several thousand in capture and broken down by the wayside, most of the latter, however, reporting for duty in a few days.

McClellan had of actual soldiers in the lines of battle and reserve eighty-seven thousand one hundred and sixty-four, his losses in battle being twelve thousand four hundred and ten, making his casualties one thousand two hundred and seventy-seven less than Lee’s.  The prisoners and cannon captured in action were about equal during the twelve days north of the Potomac, while at Harper’s Ferry Lee captured sufficient ammunition to replenish that spent in battle, and horses and wagons enough to fully equip the whole army, thousands of improved small arms, seventy-two cannon and caissons, and eleven thousand prisoners.  While the loss of prisoners, ammunition, horses, ordnance, etc., did not materially cripple the North, our losses in prisoners and killed and wounded could hardly be replaced at that time.  So in summing up the results it is doubtful whether or not the South gained any lasting benefit from the campaign beyond the Potomac.  But Lee was forced by circumstances after the enemy’s disaster at Manassas to follow up his victories and be guided by the course of events, and in that direction they lead.  McClellan offered the gauge of battle; Lee was bound to accept.  The North claimed Sharpsburg or Antietam as a victory, and the world accepted it as such.  This gave Lincoln the opportunity he had long waited for to write his famous Emancipation Proclamation.  It was not promulgated, however, till the first of January following.  Among military critics this battle would be given to Lee, even while the campaign is voted a failure.  It is an axiom in war that when one army stands upon the defensive and is attacked by the other, if the latter fails to force the former from his position, then it is considered a victory for the army standing on the defensive. (See Lee at Gettysburg and Burnsides at Fredericksburg.) While Lee was the invader, he stood on the defensive at Sharpsburg or Antietam, and McClellan did no more than press his left and centre back.  Lee held his battle line firmly, slept on the field, buried his dead the next day, then deliberately withdrew.  What better evidence is wanting to prove Lee not defeated.  McClellan claimed no more than a drawn fight.