to those important positions is directed and controlled by a political machinery far exceeding in its completeness any party organization in England or in Canada.  The party convention is now the all important portion of the machinery for the election of the president, and the safeguard provided by the constitution for the choice of the best man is a mere nullity.  One thing is quite certain, that party government under the direction of a responsible ministry, responsible to parliament and the people for every act of administration and legislation, can have far less dangerous tendencies than a party system which elects an executive not amenable to public opinion for four years, divides the responsibilities of government among several authorities, prevents harmony among party leaders, does not give the executive that control over legislation necessary to efficient administration of public affairs, and in short offers a direct premium to conflict among all the authorities of the state—­a conflict, not so much avoided by the checks and balances of the constitution as by the patience, common sense, prudence, and respect for law which presidents and their cabinets have as a rule shown at national crises.  But we can clearly see that, while the executive has lost in influence, congress has gained steadily to an extent never contemplated by the founders of the constitution, and there are thoughtful men who say that the true interests of the country have not always been promoted by the change.  Party government in Canada ensures unity of policy, since the premier of the cabinet becomes the controlling part of the political machinery of the state; no such thing as unity of policy is possible under a system which gives the president neither the dignity of a governor-general, nor the strength of a premier, and splits up political power among any number of would-be party leaders, who adopt or defeat measures by private intrigues, make irresponsible recommendations, and form political combinations for purely selfish ends.[39]

It seems quite clear then that the system of responsible ministers makes the people more immediately responsible for the efficient administration of public affairs than is possible in the United States.  The fact of having the president and the members of congress elected for different terms, and of dividing the responsibilities of government among these authorities does not allow the people to exercise that direct influence which is ensured, as the experience of Canada and of England proves, by making one body of men immediately responsible to the electors for the conduct of public affairs at frequently recurring periods, arranged by well understood rules, so as to ensure a correct expression of public opinion on all important issues.  The committees which assist in governing this country are the choice of the people’s representatives assembled in parliament, and every four or five years and sometimes even sooner in case of a crisis, the people have to decide on the wisdom of the choice.