The mutual hatred ever existing with Sunni and Shiah has always worked against very cordial relations between Turkey and Persia, and once certainly, in the sixteenth century, the fear of Persia, then actively hostile on the south-eastern border, benefited Austria and Russia by deterring the Turkish Power, in the days of its triumph and strength, from extended aggressive operations north and west of Constantinople.  Accordingly, the reconciliation of Sunni and Shiah has long been a cardinal point of policy with the Porte.  While it appears that Austria thus benefited in an indirect manner through Turkey’s fear of Persia, it is an interesting coincidence that, from the time the latter extended her diplomatic relations beyond those with Russia and England, which, for a considerable period, were the only Western Powers represented at the Shah’s Court, Austria has held a prominently friendly position in Persia.  Austrian officers have long been employed in her army, and the fact of the Emperor Francis Joseph and the late Shah Nasr-ed-Din having ascended their thrones within three months of each other in the same year (1848) was regarded by the latter as an association with himself of the highest honour and amity.  And this brings to my recollection a matter connected with the Austrian Legation at Tehran which occurred after the deportation of Jemal-ed-Din in 1891.  Mohamed Reza, the murderer of the late Shah, remained in Tehran, and continued the treasonable practices which had been originated by Jemal, even to the extent of disseminating his revolutionary opinions by means of printed papers.

The press used for printing was a lithographic one, and one of the Mirzas employed by the Austrian Legation having been drawn into Jemal’s secret society, he was induced to set it up in his own house.  The usual informer accomplice was found, or offered himself, for the purpose of betraying his brethren, and the police became so keen on capture that oblivious of the privilege enjoyed by the employe of a foreign Legation, they entered the Mirza’s house and arrested him in the act of printing treasonable papers from the lithographic press.  The Mirza was carried off to prison before the Minister knew of the occurrence, but, on being informed, he promptly made a strong remonstrance against the violation of international privilege.  The fullest satisfaction was at once given; the Chief of Police called and apologized, and the prisoner was released and sent to the Legation.

The Minister conducted his own inquiry, and on undeniable proof of the truth of what was alleged, he dismissed the Mirza from his post, and the Persian authorities were then free to arrest him.  The Mirza was kept a prisoner for some time, and was eventually released with Mohamed Reza and his companions.  The Tehran telegram of May 4 tells us that Mohamed Reza continued his old course of public hostility to the Government, and was again imprisoned, but once more obtained his release, and was granted a pension by the Shah, notwithstanding which he remained discontented, as the ‘black-mailer’ generally does, greed suggesting that the price paid for silence is inadequate.  This lenient treatment of the conspirators was quite characteristic of the later disposition of Nasr-ed-Din Shah, and his averseness to judicial severity.