The departure of the French troops to the frontier, before they were thoroughly prepared for service in the field, which is a very serious step to take, was evidently ordered for the purpose of surprising the German army, with the forces immediately at command, and thus interfering with the formation of their advance.  But, in spite of this, the German commanders did not deviate from their purpose of massing their armies on the Rhine and crossing that river.  The railway transport of the troops of the IId and IIId Corps, however, was to end at the Rhine; thence they were to march on foot into the cantonments prepared on the left bank of the river.  They moved in echelon, advancing only so many at a time as would make room for the Division behind them, as far as the line marked by the towns of Bingen, Duerkheim, and Landau.

The final advance towards the frontier was not to be undertaken until the Divisions and Corps were all collected, and provided with the all-necessary baggage train; and then proceed in a state of readiness to confront the enemy at any moment.

The assembling of the First Army appeared to be less threatened, as its route lay through neutral territory, and was protected by the garrisons of Treves, Saarlouis, and Saarbruecken, the German outposts on the Saar.

The First Army, 50,000 strong, was concentrated at Wadern, in the first days of August.  The Second Army, which meanwhile had been increased to a strength of 194,000 men, had pushed forward its cantonments to Alsenz-Guennstadt, at the termination of the Haardt Mountains, a position which had been thoroughly reconnoitered by an officer of the Staff, and where the troops might boldly await an attack.

The 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions were reconnoitering the country in front.  The regiments and squadrons of the Third Army were still gathering on both banks of the Rhine.

The French so far had made no serious attempt at Saarbruecken; Lieutenant-Colonel Pestel was able to successfully withstand their petty attacks with one battalion and three squadrons of cavalry.

It had meanwhile been observed that the French were moving further to the right, toward Forbach and Bitsch, which seemed to indicate that the two French Corps, known to be drawn up at Belfort and Strassburg, might purpose crossing the Rhine and marching on the Black Forest.  It was therefore of very great importance to set the Third Army moving at the earliest opportunity, first to protect the right bank of the Upper Rhine by an advance on the left; secondly to cover the progress of the Second Army towards that point.

A telegraphic order to that effect was dispatched on the evening of July 30th, but the General in command of the Third Army Corps desired to wait for the arrival of the Fourth and its baggage train.  In spite of this hesitancy the Second Army was ordered to proceed towards the Saar, where the French were showing much uneasiness.