Foreign armies had brought the empire to the brink of destruction; a foreign army had saved it.  For this reason the Turks wished above everything else to possess an army of their own of seventy thousand regular troops.  The inadequacy of this force for the protection of the extensive possessions of the Porte is apparent after one glance at the map.  The very dimensions preclude the concentration of the troops, scattered through so many places, when one particular spot is in danger.  The soldiers in Bagdad are 1,600 miles distant from those at Ushkodra in Albania.

This shows the great importance of establishing in the Ottoman Empire a well arranged system of militia.  It presupposes, of course, that the interests of those who rule and those who are ruled are not at variance.

The present Turkish army is a new structure on an old and battered foundation.  At present the Porte would have to look for its safety to its treaties rather than to its army; and the battles which will decide the survival of this State may as well be fought in the Ardennes or in the Waldai Mountains as in the Balkans.

The Ottoman monarchy needs above everything else a well ordered administration, for under present conditions it will scarcely be able to support even this weak army of seventy thousand men.

The impoverished condition of the country shows only too clearly in the lessened income of the State.  In vain a number of indirect taxes have been introduced.  A kind of tax on meat and meal is levied in a very primitive way on the street corners of the capital.  The fishermen pay 20 per cent, of the catch in their nets.  Weights and measures must be stamped anew every year; and all products of industry, from silverware and shawls to shoes and shirts, are stamped with the imperial seal.  But the proceeds from these taxes are enriching only those who collect them.  The riches melt before the avaricious eye of the administration, and the ruler of the most beautiful lands in three continents is drawing water with the leaky pots of the daughters of Danaus.

For the payment of its necessities the government must rely on the confiscation of property, as it passes to new heirs or outright, on the sale of offices, and finally on presents and the miserable means of adulterating the currency.

In regard to the confiscation of money inherited by State officials, the present Sultan has declared that he will do without it.  This edict, however, instead of abolishing the practice, acknowledges the correctness of the principle.  Formerly the edicts of confiscation were accompanied by the death warrants of those who were to be robbed.  Today there are gentler means in use for relieving people of the surplus of their wealth.