for 1866.  The thoughtful and far seeing diplomats, however, of the Austrian cabinet had to ask themselves:  “What will be the result?  What will be our position, if today we assist the French, and help them to beat Prussia, or even Germany?” What would have been the result if France with the help of Austria had been victorious over us?  If Austria had followed such a policy, she could have had no other aim than to resume her former position in Germany:  for this was really the only thing she had given up in 1866.  There had been no other important conditions, and the pecuniary ones had been insignificant.  Well then, what would have been the position of Austria as the presiding power in the German Union, if she had to confess that in alliance with France she had taken from Germany the left bank of the Rhine, that she had reduced the south German states to a renewed dependence on France in the shape of a Rhenish Federation, and had condemned Prussia to an irrevocable dependence on Russia, subject in future to Russian policies?  Such a position was unacceptable to all Austrian statesmen not completely blinded by wrath and vengeance.  The same is also true with us in Germany.  Imagine Austria struck from the map of Europe.  Then we and Italy would be isolated on the continent, hemmed in between Russia and France, the two strongest military powers next to Germany, either continually one against two—­and this would be most probable—­or alternately dependent on one or the other.  But this will not be the case.  It is impossible to imagine Austria away, for a State like Austria does not disappear.  It is estranged if it is jilted, as was proposed in the Villafranca negotiations, and will be inclined to offer the hand to him who, on his part, has been the opponent of an unreliable friend.

In short, if we wish to avoid being isolated, which is especially dangerous for Germany in our assailable position, we must have a reliable friend.  Thanks to the similarities of our interests, and this treaty before you, we have two such friends.  It is not love which makes them reliable, for nations may make war one upon the other because they hate, but it has never yet happened that one nation has sacrificed itself for the other for mere love.  Nor do they always fight when they hate each other, for, if this were the case, France would have to be fighting incessantly, not only with us, but also with England and Italy.  She hates all her neighbors.  I also believe that the Russian hatred of us, which has been artificially fanned, will not last.  We are united with our allies in love of peace, not only by inclination and friendship, but also by the most cogent interests of a European equilibrium and of our own future.

For these reasons I believe you will approve the Emperor’s policy that has concluded the published treaty, although it increases the possibility of war.