aggressive wars at all.  What the Russian press says, I do not believe, what Emperor Alexander says, I believe; I have absolute confidence in it.  When both are in the scales, the testimony of the Russian press, with its hatred of Germany, rises light as a feather, and the personal testimony of Emperor Alexander has the only effective weight, so far as I am concerned.  I repeat, therefore, the press does not induce me to consider our relations with Russia to be worse today than they were a year ago.

I now come to the other point, the allocation of the troops.  It used to take place on a big scale, but only since 1879, when the Turkish war was concluded, has it assumed the proportions which today seem threatening.  It may easily appear as if this accumulation of Russian troops near the German and Austrian frontiers—­where their support is more difficult and more expensive than farther inland—­could only be dictated by the intention of surprising and attacking one of the neighbors unprepared, sans dire gare! (I cannot for the moment think of the German expression.) Well, I do not believe this.  In the first place, it would be contrary to the character of the sovereign and his own words, and secondly its object could not easily be understood.  Russia cannot intend to conquer any Prussian provinces, nor, I believe, any Austrian provinces.  Russia has, I believe, as many Polish subjects as it cares to have, and has no desire to increase their numbers.  To annex anything but Polish districts from Austria would be even more difficult.  No reason exists, no pretense which could induce a European monarch suddenly to assail his neighbors.  I even go so far in my confidence as to be convinced that a Russian war would not ensue if we should become involved in a French war because of some explosive happenings in France, which no one can foresee and which surely are not intended by the present French government.  A French war, on the other hand, would be an absolute certainty if we should be involved in a Russian war, for no French government would be so strong that it could prevent it, even if it was inclined to do so.  But as regards Russia I still declare that I am not looking for an attack; and I take back nothing from what I said last year.

You will ask:  “If that is so, what is the use of this expensive allocation of the Russian troops?” That is one of the questions for which one hardly can expect an answer from a ministry of foreign affairs, itself vitally interested.  If we should begin to ask for explanations, we might receive forced replies, and our surrejoinders would also have to be forced.  That is a dangerous path which I do not like to tread.  Allocations of troops are things for which one does not take the other country to task, asking for categorical explanations, but against which one takes counter precautions with equal reserve and circumspection.  I cannot, therefore, give an authentic declaration concerning the motives of this Russian allocation,