As long as we follow this policy we are in the position to save a power which has secret wishes from the embarrassment of meeting with a refusal or an unpleasant reply from its—­let me say, congressional opponent.  If we are equally friendly with both, we can first sound one and then say to the other:  “Do not do that, try to arrange matters in this way.”  These are helps in business which should be highly esteemed.  I have an experience of many years in such matters, and it has been brought home to me often, that when two are alone the thread drops more frequently and is not picked up because of false shame.  The moment when it could be picked up passes, people separate in silence, and are annoyed.  If, however, a third person is present, he can pick up the thread without much ado, and bring the two together again when they have parted.  This is the function of which I am thinking and which corresponds to the amicable relations in which we are living with our friendly neighbors along our extensive borders.  It is moreover in keeping with the union among the three imperial courts which has existed for five years, and the intimacy which we enjoy with England, another one of the powers chiefly concerned in this matter.  As regards England we are in the fortunate position of not having any conflicting interests, except perhaps some trade rivalries or passing annoyances.  These latter cannot be avoided, but there is absolutely nothing which could drive two industrious and peace-loving nations to war.  I happily believe, therefore, that we may be the mediator between England and Russia, just as I know we are between Austria and Russia, if they should not be able to agree of their own accord.

The three-emperor-pact, if one wishes to call it such, while it is generally called a treaty, is not based on any written obligations, and no one of the three emperors can be voted down by the other two.  It is based on the personal sympathy among the three rulers, on the personal confidence which they have in one another, and on the personal relations which for many years have existed among the leading ministers of all three empires.

We have always avoided forming a majority of two against one when there was a difference of opinion between Austria and Russia, and we have never definitely taken the part of one of them, even if our own desires drew us more strongly in that direction.  We have refrained from this for fear that the tie might not be sufficiently strong after all.  It surely cannot be so strong that it could induce one of these great powers to disregard its own incontestably national interests for the sake of being obliging.  That is a sacrifice which no great power makes pour les beaux yeux of another.  Such a sacrifice it makes only when arguments are replaced by hints of strength.  Then it may happen that the great power will say:  “I hate to make this concession, but I hate even worse to go to war with so strong a power as Germany.  Still I will remember this and make a note of it.”  That is about the way in which such things are received.  And this leads me to the necessity of vigorously opposing all exaggerated demands made on Germany’s mediation.  Let me declare that they are out of the question so long as I have the honor of being the adviser of His Majesty.