In the course of centuries the wars against France had resulted almost always to our disadvantage, because Germany had been divided.  This had created a geographical and strategic frontier which was full of temptations for France and of menace for Germany.  I cannot describe our condition before the last war, and especially that of South Germany, more strikingly than with the words of a thoughtful South German sovereign.  When Germany was urged to take the part of the western powers in the oriental war, although her governments were not convinced that this was in their interest, this sovereign—­there is no reason why I should not name him, it was the late King William of Wuertemberg—­said to me:  “I share your view, that we have no call to mix in this war, and that no German interests are at stake of sufficient worth to spill a drop of German blood for them.  But what will happen if we should quarrel with the western powers on this account?  You may count on my vote in the Bundestag until war is at hand.  Then conditions will be altered.  I am as ready as the next man to fulfil my obligations.  But take care lest you judge people differently from what they are.  Give us Strassburg, and we shall be with you at all hazards.  As long as Strassburg is a sally-port for an ever armed force, I must fear that my country will be inundated by foreign troops before the North German Alliance can come to my assistance.  Personally I shall not hesitate a moment to eat the hard bread of exile in your camp, but my people, weighed down by contributions, will write to me urging a change of policy upon me.  I do not know what I shall do, nor whether all will remain sufficiently firm.  The crux of the situation is Strassburg, for as long as it is not German, it will prevent South Germany from giving herself unreservedly to German unity and to a national German policy.  As long as Strassburg is a sally-port for an ever ready army of from 100,000 to 150,000 men, Germany will find herself unable to appear on the upper Rhine with an equally large army on time—­the French will always be here first.”

I believe this instance taken from an actual occurrence says everything.  I need not add one word.

The wedge which Alsace pushed into Germany near Weissenburg separated South Germany from North Germany more effectively than the political line of the Main.  It needed a high degree of determination, national enthusiasm, and devotion for our South German allies not to hesitate one moment but to identify the danger of North Germany with their own and to advance boldly in our company, in spite of that other danger in their own immediate proximity to which a clever conduct of the war on the part of France would have exposed them.  That France in her superior position had been ready to yield to the temptation, which this advanced outpost of Strassburg offered her against Germany, whenever her internal affairs made an excursion into foreign lands desirable, we had seen for many decades.