Judge Smith nor Mr. Webster nor the court nor the counsel on the other side, attached much importance to this point.  Curiously enough, the theory had been originated many years before, by Wheelock himself, at a time when he expected that the minority of the trustees would invoke the aid of the Legislature against him, and his idea had been remembered.  It was revived at the time of the newspaper controversy, and was pressed upon the attention of the trustees and upon that of their counsel.  But the lawyers attached little weight to the suggestion, although they introduced it and argued it briefly.  Mason, Smith, and Webster all relied for success on the ground covered by the first point in Mason’s brief.  This is called by Mr. Shirley the “Parsons view,” from the fact that it was largely drawn from an argument made by Chief Justice Parsons in regard to visitatorial powers at Harvard College.  Briefly stated, the argument was that the college was an institution founded by private persons for particular uses; that the charter was given to perpetuate such uses; that misconduct of the trustees was a question for the courts, and that the Legislature, by its interference, transcended its powers.  To these general principles, strengthened by particular clauses in the Constitution of New Hampshire, the counsel for the college trusted for victory.  The theory of impairing the obligation of contracts they introduced, but they did not insist on it, or hope for much from it.  On this point, however, and, of course, on this alone, the case went up to the Supreme Court.  In December, 1817, Mr. Webster wrote to Mr. Mason, regretting that the case went up on “one point only.”  He occupied himself at this time in devising cases which should raise what he considered the really vital points, and which, coming within the jurisdiction of the United States, could be taken to the Circuit Court, and thence to the Supreme Court at Washington.  These cases, in accordance with his suggestion, were begun, but before they came on in the Circuit Court, Mr. Webster made his great effort in Washington.  Three quarters of his legal argument were there devoted to the points in the Circuit Court cases, which were not in any way before the Supreme Court in the College vs.  Woodward.  So little, indeed, did Mr. Webster think of the great constitutional question which has made the case famous, that he forced the other points in where he admitted that they had no proper standing, and argued them at length.  They were touched upon by Marshall, who, however, decided wholly upon the constitutional question, and they were all thrown aside by Judge Washington, who declared them irrelevant, and rested his decision solely and properly on the constitutional point.  Two months after his Washington argument, Mr. Webster, still urging forward the Circuit Court cases, wrote to Mr. Mason that all the questions must be brought properly before the Supreme Court, and that, on the “general principle” that