Subsequently, in the Reichstag, Chancellor von Buelow described the course the German Government pursued immediately before and during the war; and there seems no reason to discredit his account.  The speech was made apropos of the projected visit of President Kruger to Berlin, when on his tour of despair to the capitals of Europe while the war was still in progress.  He was cheered by boulevard crowds in Paris, itself a thing of no great significance, and was received at the Elysee and by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Delcasse.  The visitor was very reserved on both occasions, and confined himself to sounding his hosts as to whether or not he could reckon on their good offices.

From Paris he started for Berlin, where he had engaged a large and expensive first-floor suite of rooms in a fashionable hotel.  At Cologne, however, shortly after entering Germany, a telegram from Potsdam awaited him, announcing the Emperor’s refusal to grant him audience.  The imperial telegram consisted of a few words to the effect that the Emperor was “not in a position” to receive him.  Nor in truth was he.  An audience at that moment would have meant war between Germany and England.

As to German policy with regard to the Boer War, Prince Buelow explained that the German Government deplored the war not only because it was between two Christian and white races, that were, moreover, of the same Germanic stock, but also because it drew within the evil circle of its consequences important German economic and political interests.  He went on to describe their nature, enumerating under the one head the thousands of German settlers in South Africa, the industrial establishments and banks they had founded there, the busy trade and the millions sterling of invested capital; while, as regarded the other head, the Government had to take care that the war exercised no injurious influence on German territory in that region.

The Government, the Chancellor claimed, had done everything consistent with neutrality and the conservation of German interests to hinder the outbreak of the war.  It had “loyally” warned the two Dutch republics of the disposition in Europe, and left them in no doubt as to the attitude Germany would adopt if war should come.  These communications were not made directly, but through the Hague authorities and the Consul-General of the Netherlands in Pretoria.  At that time the United States Government had come forward with a proposal for a submission of the quarrel to its arbitration, but the proposal had been rejected by President Kruger.

A little later the President changed his mind, but it was then too late and war was declared.  Once the die was cast, Germany could only with propriety have interfered, provided she had reason to believe her mediation would be accepted by both parties:  otherwise her conduct would not be mediation, but be regarded, in accordance with diplomatic usage, as intervention with coercive measures in the background.  For such a policy Germany had no disposition, for it meant running the risk of a diplomatic defeat on the one hand and of an armed conflict with England on the other.