At the time of the accession, the chessboard of our metaphor was mainly occupied with Franco-German relations and with Russian designs on Constantinople, the Dardanelles, and the Black Sea.  The danger to Germany of war with France, which had arisen out of the Boulanger and Schnaebele incidents, had died down, but not altogether ceased.  Hohenlohe tells us how at this time, in conversation with the Emperor, the latter ventured the forecast:  “Boulanger is sure to succeed.  I prophesy that as Kaiser Ernest he will pay a visit to Berlin.”  He was wrong, we know, as so many prophets are.

Russian designs on Turkey had had to reckon with the opposition of England and Austria.  As regards these designs, Bismarck says: 

“Germany’s policy should be one of reserve.  Germany would act very foolishly if in Oriental questions, without having special interests, she took a side before the other Powers, who were more nearly interested:  she would therefore do well to refrain from making her move as long as possible, and thus, besides, gain the benefit of longer peace.”

The Chancellor, however, admitted that against the advantages of a policy of reserve had to be set the disadvantage of Germany’s position in the centre of Europe with its frontiers exposed to the attacks of a coalition.  “From this situation,” said the Chancellor, “it results that Germany is perhaps the only Great Power in Europe which is not tempted to attain its ends by victorious war.”

“Our interest,” he goes on,

“is to maintain peace, whereas our continental neighbours without exception have wishes, either secret or officially admitted, which can only be fulfilled through war.  Consequently, German policy must be to prevent war or confine it as much as possible:  to keep in the background while the European game of cards is going on:  and not by loss of patience or concession at the cost of the country, or vanity, or provocation from friends, allow ourselves to be driven from the waiting attitude:  otherwise—­plectuntur Achivi!—­third parties will rejoice.”

That was the Bismarckian policy twenty-five years ago, and though new economic conditions have had great influence in modifying it since, particularly as it regards the East, it is practically Germany’s policy now.

In his first speech from the throne to the Reichstag the Emperor thus referred to the Triple Alliance: 

“Our Alliance with Austria-Hungary is publicly known.  I hold to the same with German fidelity, not merely because it has been concluded, but because I see in this defensive union a foundation for the balance of power in Europe and a legacy of German history, the importance of which is recognized by the whole of the German people, while it accords with European international law as undeniably in force up to 1866.  Similar historical relations and similar national exigences of the time bind us to Italy.  Both Germany and