Apart from this view of the incident, it is clear that Germany was pursuing her claim to a “place in the sun,” and she did so to the unconcealed annoyance of nations which up to then had never thought of her in a role she appeared to be aspiring to, that of a Mediterranean Power.  To these nations she seemed an intruder in a sphere to which she neither naturally nor rightfully belonged.  Evidently she had no political or historical claims in Morocco, while her commercial interests were less than 10 per cent of Morocco trade.

A narration of the incident may, for the sake of convenience, though involving some anticipation of the future, be dealt with in three sections:  from the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, and the Emperor’s visit to Tangier in March, 1905, to the Act of Algeciras a year subsequently; from the Act of Algeciras to the Franco-German Agreement of 1909; and from that to the—­let it be hoped—­final settlement by the Franco-German Agreement of November 5, 1911.

The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 gave France a free hand in Morocco in consideration of France giving England a similar position in Egypt and the Nile Valley.  The state of things in Morocco at this time was one of discord and rebellion.  In the midst of it, the Sultan, El Hassan, died, and was succeeded by Abdul Aziz, a minor.  On coming of age Abdul Aziz showed his inability to rule, the country fell again into disorder and Abdul turned for help to France.  Meantime England and France had been negotiating without the knowledge of Germany, and in April, 1904, the Anglo-French Agreement was signed.  It was accompanied by an official declaration that France had no intention of changing the political status of Morocco, but only contemplated a policy there of “pacific penetration and reforms.”  Thereupon Prince von Buelow, the German Chancellor, stated in the Reichstag that the German Government had no reason to assume that the Agreement was directed against any Power and that “it appeared to be an attempt by England and France to come to a friendly understanding respecting their colonial differences.”

“From the standpoint of German interests,” continued the Chancellor, “we have no objections to raise to it.”  No parliamentary reference was made to Morocco until March, 1905, when the Chancellor spoke of the approaching visit of the Emperor to Tangier, and it became evident that the Emperor and his advisers had come to the conclusion that, as France seemed about assuming a full protectorate over Morocco, as she had tried to do in Tunis, and that this, in accordance with French policy, would result in the exclusion of other nationals from commerce and the development of the country, Germany must take action.  Prince von Buelow explained that “his Majesty had, in the previous year, declared to the King of Spain that Germany pursued no policy of territorial acquisition in Morocco.”  He continued: 

“Independent of the visit, and independent of the territorial question, is the question whether we have economic interests to protect in Morocco.  That we have certainly.  We have in Morocco, as in China, a considerable interest in the maintenance of the open door, that is the equal treatment of all trading nations.”

And he concluded by saying: