for it.  In that year the National Assembly of delegates from various German Diets, which met at Frankfort, voted for the marine a million sterling to be levied on the German States, but only one-half of the money could be collected.  Still, three steam frigates, one large and six small steam corvettes, and two sailing corvettes were got together, but in 1852, owing to the poverty of the States, two of the ships were sold to Prussia for L60,000 and the rest disposed of by auction at less than a fourth of their value.  The officers and men were disbanded with a year’s pay.

To this humiliating state of things Bismarck refers in his “Gedanken und Erinnerungen.”  “The German fleet,” he writes,

“and Kiel harbour as a foundation for its institution, were from 1848 on one of the most burning thoughts at whose fire German aspirations for unity were accustomed to warm themselves and to concentrate.  Meanwhile, however, the hatred of my parliamentary opponents was stronger than the interest for a German fleet, and it seemed to me that the Progressive party at that time preferred to see the newly-acquired rights of Prussia to Kiel, and the prospect of a maritime future founded on its possession, rather in the hands of the auctioneer, Hannibal Fischer, than in those of a Bismarck Ministry.”

From this on naval development in Prussia was slow; there was no interest for a marine either among the governing classes or the people; but it was not wholly neglected, for Wilhelmshaven was acquired from the Duchy of Oldenburg, a small fleet was sent to the Orient with a view to obtaining commercial treaties and concessions, and a sum of L320,000 was devoted annually to naval requirements.  During the Danish War of 1864 a fleet of three screw corvettes, two paddle steamers, and a few gunboats was considered sufficient to protect the coasts and make a blockade impossible.

From 1885 onwards there had been several Navy Proposals, but it was in that of 1889, a year after the Emperor’s accession, that the beginning of Germany’s naval policy is to be found.  In that Proposal it was announced that the Government intended to depart from the previous principles of naval policy which had “become antiquated owing to the progress of science and the character of future naval warfare, as also owing to the extension of Germany’s oversea relations.”  Up to this time German maritime needs had invariably been postponed to military requirements.  The necessity for a fleet was indeed recognized, but only for purposes of coast defence and the prevention of a blockade of the ports on the North Sea and Baltic.  To this end no large fleet was considered needful, particularly as the war with France had demonstrated the futility of coast attack.  During that war two small fleets were sent from Cherbourg to blockade the North Sea and Baltic coasts, but the admirals in charge found the task “impossible” and returned to France after a few single engagements with divided honours had occurred.  At that time the German people felt entirely secure on the score of invasion.  The numerous espionage incidents of more recent times prove that this feeling of security has entirely passed away, and all countries are now armed as though they were to be invaded to-morrow.