of our own country, and some foreigners of the first rank, both for skill and station in arms, that in most victories obtained in the present war, the British troops were ever employed in the post of danger and honour, and usually began the attack (being allowed to be naturally more fearless than the people of any other country), by which they were not only an example of courage to the rest, but must be acknowledged, without partiality, to have governed the fortune of the day; since it is known enough, how small a part of an army is generally engaged in any battle.  It may likewise be added, that nothing is of greater moment in war than opinion.  The French, by their frequent losses, which they chiefly attributed to the courage of our men, believed that a British general, at the head of British troops, was not to be overcome; and the Marechal de Villars was quickly sensible of the advantage he had got; for, in a very few days after the desertion of the allies, happened the Earl of Albemarle’s disgrace at Denain, by a feint of the Marechal’s, and a manifest failure somewhere or other, both of courage and conduct on the side of the confederates.  The blame of which was equally shared between Prince Eugene and the Earl; although it is certain, the Duke of Ormonde gave the latter timely warning of his danger, observing he was neither intrenched as he ought, nor provided with bridges sufficient for the situation he was in, and at such a distance from the main army.[16]

[Footnote 16:  It is alleged by the continuator of Rapin, that the surprise and defeat of the confederated troops under the Earl of Albemarle, at Denain, was, in a great measure, owing to the Duke of Ormonde having, in spite of all remonstrance, reclaimed and carried off certain pontoons which had been lent to the allies.  For Prince Eugene having received intelligence of the design against Albemarle, marched to his succour; but the bridge having broken under the quantity of the baggage which had been transported across the Scheldt, he could only remain the spectator of their misfortune. [S.]]

The Marquis de Torcy had likewise the same sentiments, of what mighty consequence those few British battalions were to the confederate army; since he advised his master to deliver up Dunkirk, although the Queen could not perform the condition understood, which was a cessation of arms of all the foreign forces in her pay.

It must be owned, that Mons. de Torcy made great merit of this confidence that his master placed in the Queen; and observing Her Majesty’s displeasure against the Dutch, on account of their late proceedings, endeavoured to inflame it with aggravations enough; insinuating, “That, since the States had acted so ungratefully, the Queen should let her forces join with those of France, in order to compel the confederates to a peace.”  But although this overture were very tenderly hinted from the French court, Her Majesty heard it with the utmost abhorrence; and ordered