with Christine as the heroine.  But Hebbel’s first Viennese triumph did not come until February 19, 1863, when Christine played Brunhild in the first and second parts of the Nibelungen.  On his deathbed he received the news that the Berlin Schiller Prize had been awarded to him for the Nibelungen.  Hebbel died on the thirteenth of December, 1863.  Christine out-lived him by nearly half a century, until the twenty-ninth of June, 1910.

Rightly or wrongly, Hebbel regarded himself as the creator of a new form of drama, setting in at a step beyond Shakespeare and Schiller, and attacking problems in the manner suggested, but not fully developed, by Goethe.  Shakespeare and Schiller, he said, locate the conflict in the breast of the hero:  shall he, or shall he not, endeavor to attain the object of his desire, against forces which oppose him from without, and which have their allies in his own conscience, in his own sense of right and wrong?  He desires the wrong, or neglects the right, and for his tragic fault atones with death.  We pity the unfortunate individual, console ourselves, however, with the inviolability of the moral law, and profit by his example:  only those are free whose will chooses to be moral.  But Goethe, in the dramatically conceived Elective Affinities, focuses attention not upon the doings of individuals, but upon the sanctions of the law which a power superior to their wills forces them to break.  And so Hebbel, passing over the individual, as one of myriads, directs inquiry into the causes that make him what he is, that make him do what he does, that prevent him from doing what at the same time they impel him to attempt; and he reveals, back of the individual typical phenomenon, an irreconcilable conflict in the very condition and definition of its existence.  This conflict has its roots in the dualism of all being.

The corner-stone of Martin Luther’s system of morals was the paradox:  “A Christian is a sovereign lord over all things, and is subject to nobody; a Christian is a duty-bound servant of all things, and is subject to everybody.”  In other words, a man’s soul is his own and is superior to all the things of the flesh; but through his body he is made dependent upon the life-giving earth, and subject to the laws which those other “bodies” in the community in which he lives make for the common defense and the general welfare.  Hebbel carried the antithesis farther, asking what is the soul, and what is the body?  And he answered, in effect, that the soul is indeed the very essence of personality, but is no original, self-begotten, and self-sufficient entity—­on the contrary, it is a fragment, a participant in the animating principle of the universe—­and that the body is indeed the medium of contact between person and person, but is also the separating barrier of soul from soul, and of the individual soul from the soul of the world.  The body is the form or vessel which vouchsafes to the soul individual existence, and which the soul, by its very impulse to activity, wears out and destroys.  Birth is a prophecy of destruction and a doom to death.