to outstrip in mere information some of the greatest teachers of the past.  No doubt, that little knowledge which thinks itself to be great may possibly be a dangerous, as it certainly is a most ridiculous thing.  We have all suffered under that eminently absurd individual who on the strength of one or two volumes, imperfectly apprehended by himself, and long discredited in the estimation of everyone else, is prepared to supply you on the shortest notice with a dogmatic solution of every problem suggested by this “unintelligible world” or the political variety of the same pernicious genus, whose statecraft consists in the ready application to the most complex question of national interest of some high-sounding commonplace which has done weary duty on a thousand platforms, and which even in its palmiest days was never fit for anything better than a peroration.  But in our dislike of the individual, do not let us mistake the diagnosis of his disease.  He suffers not from ignorance but from stupidity.  Give him learning and you make him not wise, but only more pretentious in his folly.

I say then that so far from a little knowledge being undesirable, a little knowledge is all that on most subjects any of us can hope to attain; and that, as a source not of worldly profit but of personal pleasure, it may be of incalculable value to its possessor.  But it will naturally be asked, “How are we to select from among the infinite number of things which may be known, those which it is best worth while for us to know?” We are constantly being told to concern ourselves with learning what is important, and not to waste our energies upon what is insignificant.  But what are the marks by which we shall recognize the important, and how is it to be distinguished from the insignificant.  A precise and complete answer to this question which shall be true for all men cannot be given.  I am considering knowledge, recollect, as it ministers to enjoyment; and from this point of view each unit of information is obviously of importance in proportion as it increases the general sum of enjoyment which we obtain, or expect to obtain, from knowledge.  This, of course, makes it impossible to lay down precise rules which shall be an equally sure guide to all sorts and conditions of men; for in this, as in other matters, tastes must differ, and against real difference of taste there is no appeal.

There is, however, one caution which it may be worth your while to keep in view:—­Do not be persuaded into applying any general proposition on this subject with a foolish impartiality to every kind of knowledge.  There are those who tell you that it is the broad generalities and the far-reaching principles which govern the world, which are alone worthy of your attention.  A fact which is not an illustration of a law, in the opinion of these persons appears to lose all its value.  Incidents which do not fit into some great generalization, events which are merely picturesque, details which