The means which they found was nullification; and it fell to South Carolina, whose people were most ardent in their resentment of anything that looked like discrimination, to put the remedy to the test.  The Legislature of this State had made an early beginning by denouncing the tariff of 1824 as unconstitutional.  In 1827 Robert J. Turnbull, one of the abler political leaders, published under the title of The Crisis a series of essays in which he boldly proclaimed nullification as the remedy.  In the following summer Calhoun put the nullification doctrine into its first systematic form in a paper—­the so-called Exposition—­which for some time was known to the public only as the report of a committee of the Legislature.

By 1829 the State was sharply divided into two parties, the nationalists and the nullifiers.  All were agreed that the protective system was iniquitous and that it must be broken down.  The difference was merely as to method.  The nationalists favored working through the customary channels of legislative reform; the nullifiers urged that the State interpose its authority to prevent the enforcement of the objectionable laws.  For a time the leaders wavered.  But the swing of public sentiment in the direction of nullification was rapid and overwhelming, and one by one the representatives in Congress and other men of prominence fell into line.  Hayne and McDuffie were among the first to give it their support; and Calhoun, while he was for a time held back by his political aspirations and by his obligations as Vice President, came gradually to feel that his political future would be worth little unless he had the support of his own State.

As the election of 1828 approached, the hope of the discontented forces centered in Jackson.  They did not overlook the fact that his record was that of a moderate protectionist.  But the same was true of many South Carolinians and Georgians, and it seemed not at all impossible that, as a Southern man and a cotton planter, he should undergo a change of heart no less decisive than that which Hayne and Calhoun had experienced.  Efforts to draw him out, however, proved not very successful.  Lewis saw to it that Jackson’s utterances while yet he was a candidate were safely colorless; and the single mention of the tariff contained in the inaugural address was susceptible of the most varied interpretations.  The annual message of 1829 indicated opposition to protection; on the other hand, the presidential message of the next year not only asserted the full power of Congress to levy protective duties but declared the abandonment of protection “neither to be expected or desired.”  Gradually the antiprotectionist leaders were made to see that the tariff was not a subject upon which the President felt keenly, and that therefore it was useless to look to him for effective support.

Even the adroit efforts which were made to get from the incoming executive expressions that could be interpreted as endorsements of nullification were successfully fended off.  For some months the President gave no outward sign of his disapproval.  With more than his usual deliberateness, Jackson studied the situation, awaiting the right moment to speak out with the maximum of effect.