After all, it was Spain’s business to keep order on the frontier; and the United States waited a year and a half for the Madrid Government to give evidence of intent to do so.  But, as nothing but vain promises were forthcoming, some American troops engaged in building a fort on the Apalachicola, just north of the boundary line, marched down the river in July, 1816, bombarded Nicholls’s Negro Fort, blew up its magazine, and practically exterminated the Negro and Indian garrison.  A menace to the slave property of southern Georgia was thus removed, but the bigger problem remained.  The Seminoles were restive; the refugee Creeks kept up their forays across the border; and the rich lands acquired by the Treaty of Fort Jackson were fast filling with white settlers who clamored for protection.  Though the Monroe Administration had opened negotiations for the cession of the whole Florida country to the United States, progress was slow and the outcome doubtful.

Matters came to a head in the closing weeks of 1817.  General Gaines, who was in command on the Florida border, had tried repeatedly to get an interview with the principal “Red Stick” chieftain, but all of his overtures had been repulsed.  Finally he sent a detachment of soldiers to conduct the dignitary and his warriors from their village at Fowltown, on the American side of the line, to a designated parley ground.  In no mood for negotiation, the chief ordered his followers to fire on the visitors; whereupon the latter seized and destroyed the village.

The fight at Fowltown may be regarded as the beginning of the Seminole War.  General Gaines was directed to begin operations against the Indians and to pursue them if necessary into East Florida; but before he could carry out his orders, Jackson was put in personal command of the forces acting against the Indians and was instructed to concentrate all of the troops in his department at Fort Scott and to obtain from the Governors of Georgia and Tennessee such other assistance as he should need.

Jackson received his orders at the Hermitage.  Governor Blount was absent from Nashville, but the eager commander went ahead raising troops on his own responsibility.  Nothing was so certain to whet his appetite for action as the prospect of a war in Florida.  Not only did his instructions authorize him to pursue the enemy, under certain conditions, into Spanish territory, but from the first he himself conceived of the enterprise as decidedly more than a punitive expedition.  The United States wanted Florida and was at the moment trying to induce Spain to give it up.

Here was the chance to take it regardless of Spain, “Let it be signified to me through any channel (say Mr. J. Rhea),” wrote the Major General to the President, “that the possession of the Floridas would be desirable to the United States, and in sixty days it will be accomplished.”