up to Capron’s support.”  As a matter of fact, all the troops travelled at exactly the same rate of speed, although there were stragglers from each, and when Capron halted and sent back word that he had come upon the Spanish outpost, the entire regiment closed up, halted, and most of the men sat down.  We then, some minutes after the first word had been received, and before any firing had begun, received instructions to deploy.  I had my right wing partially deployed before the first shots between the outposts took place.  Within less than three minutes I had G Troop, with Llewellen, Greenway, and Leahy, and one platoon of K Troop under Kane, on the firing-line, and it was not until after we reached the firing-line that the heavy volley-firing from the Spaniards began.

On page 94 Mr. Bonsal says:  “A vexatious delay occurred before the two independent columns could communicate and advance with concerted action. . . .  When the two columns were brought into communication it was immediately decided to make a general attack upon the Spanish position. . . .  With this purpose in view, the following disposition of the troops was made before the advance of the brigade all along the line was ordered.”  There was no communication between the two columns prior to the general attack, nor was any order issued for the advance of the brigade all along the line.  The attacks were made wholly independently, and the first communication between the columns was when the right wing of the Rough Riders in the course of their advance by their firing dislodged the Spaniards from the hill across the ravine to the right, and then saw the regulars come up that hill.

Mr. Bonsal’s account of what occurred among the regulars parallels his account of what occurred among the Rough Riders.  He states that the squadron of the Tenth Cavalry delivered the main attack upon the hill, which was the strongest point of the Spanish position; and he says of the troopers of the Tenth Cavalry that “their better training enabled them to render more valuable service than the other troops engaged.”  In reality, the Tenth Cavalrymen were deployed in support of the First, though they mingled with them in the assault proper; and so far as there was any difference at all in the amount of work done, it was in favor of the First.  The statement that the Tenth Cavalry was better trained than the First, and rendered more valuable service, has not the slightest basis whatsoever of any kind, sort, or description, in fact.  The Tenth Cavalry did well what it was required to do; as an organization, in this fight, it was rather less heavily engaged, and suffered less loss, actually and relatively, than either the First Cavalry or the Rough Riders.  It took about the same part that was taken by the left wing of the Rough Riders, which wing was similarly rather less heavily engaged than the right and centre of the regiment.  Of course, this is a reflection neither on the Tenth Cavalry nor on the left wing of the Rough Riders.  Each body simply did what it was ordered to do, and did it well.  But to claim that the Tenth Cavalry did better than the First, or bore the most prominent part in the fight, is like making the same claim for the left wing of the Rough Riders.  All the troops engaged did well, and all alike are entitled to share in the honor of the day.