You are now to imagine the throne vacant, the actors in the late events passive spectators of what was to follow, and opportunity for a recurrence to parliamentary tactics.  Men had leisure to weigh consequences.  Another political crusade menaced France, and it is probable that nothing prevented its taking place, but the manifestations of popular sympathy in England, and on the Rhine.  Then there was danger, too, that the bankers and manufacturers, and great landed proprietors, would lose the stake for which they had been playing, by permitting a real ascendancy of the majority.  Up to that moment, the mass had looked to the opposition in the deputies as to their friends.  In order to entice all parties, or, at least, as many as possible, the cry had been “la charte;” and the opposition had become identified with its preservation.  The new Chambers had been convened, and, after the struggle was over, the population naturally turned to those who had hitherto appeared in their ranks as leaders.  This fragment of the representation became of necessity the repository of all power.

Lafayette had, thus far, been supported by the different sections of the opposition; for his influence with the mass to suppress violence, was looked to as of the last importance, by even his enemies.  The very men who accused him of Jacobinical principles, and a desire to unsettle society, felt a security under his protection, that they would not have felt without him.  Louis-Philippe, you will remember, made use of him, until the trial of the ministers was ended, when he was unceremoniously dismissed from the command of the National Guards, by the suppression of the office.[14] “It would have been in my power to declare a republic,” he continued, in the course of his explanations, “and sustained by the populace of Paris, backed by the National Guards, I might have placed myself at its head.  But six weeks would have closed my career, and that of the republic.  The governments of Europe would have united to put us down, and the Bourbons had, to a great degree, disarmed France.  We were not in a state to resist.  The two successful invasions had diminished the confidence of the nation, which, moreover, would have been nearly equally divided in itself.  But, allowing that we might have overcome our foreign enemies, a result I admit to have been possible, by the aid of the propaganda and the general disaffection, there would have been a foe at home, that certainly would have prevailed against us.  Those gentlemen of the Chambers to whom a large portion of the people looked up with confidence, would have thwarted every important measure I attempted, and were there no other means to prevent a republic, they would have thrown me into the river.”

[Footnote 14:  The writer has had a hundred occasions to learn, since his return to America, how much truth is perverted in crossing the Atlantic, and how little is really known of even prominent European facts, on this side of the water.  It has suited some one to say, that Lafayette resigned the office of commander-in-chief of the National Guards, and the fact is thus stated in most of our publications.  The office was suppressed without consulting him, and, it was his impression, at the instigation of the Allied Powers.  Something like an awkward explanation and a permission to resign was subsequently attempted.]