There is but one interest that would be likely to unite all the south against the north, and this was the interest connected with slavery.  Now, it was notorious that neither the federal government nor the individual states have anything to do with this as a national question, and it was not easy to see in what manner anything could be done that would be likely to push matters as far as disunion on such a point There might be, and there probably would be, discussion and denunciations—­nay, there often had been; but a compromise having been virtually made, by which all new states at the north are to be free states, and all at the south slave-holding, I saw nothing else that was likely to be serious.[46] As respects all other interests, it would be difficult to unite the whole south.  Taking the present discussion as an example:  those that were disaffected, to use the strongest term the case admits of, were so environed by those that were not, that a serious separation became impossible.  The tier of states that lies behind the Carolinas, Virginia, and Georgia, for instance, are in no degree dependent on them for an outlet to the sea, while they are so near neighbours as to overshadow them in a measure.  Then the south must always have a northern boundary of free states, if they separate en masse—­a circumstance not very desirable, as they would infallibly lose most of their slaves.

[Footnote 46:  Recent facts have confirmed this opinion.]

On the other hand, the north is very differently situated.  New England, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and the tier of states west, are closely connected geographically, must and would go together, and they have one frontier that is nearly all water.  They contain already a free population of eight millions, which is rapidly increasing, and are strong enough, and united enough, to act as they please.  It is their interest to remain united with the south, and it is also a matter of feeling with them, and I apprehend little to the Union so long as these states continue of this mind.[47]

[Footnote 47:  This was written before the recent events in Texas, which give a new aspect to the question.]

Lafayette wished to know if I did not think the Union was getting too large for its safety.  I thought not, so long as the means of necessary intercommunication were preserved, but just the reverse, as the larger the Union, the less probability there would be of agitating its whole surface by any one interest; and the parties that were tranquil, as a matter of course, would influence those that were disturbed.  Were the Union to-day, for instance, confined to the coast, as it was forty years since, there would be no south-western states to hold the southern in check, as we all know is the fact at present, and the danger from nullification would be doubled.  These things act both ways; for even the state governments, while they offer positive organised and quasi legal means of resisting