Each department should send an allotted number of deputies, the polls being distributed on the American plan.  Respecting the term of service, there might arise various considerations, but it should not exceed five years, and I would prefer three.  The present house of peers should be converted into a senate, its members to sit as long as the deputies.  I see no use in making the term of one body longer than the other, and I think it very easy to show that great injury has arisen from the practice among ourselves.  Neither do I see the advantage of having a part go out periodically; but, on the contrary, a disadvantage, as it leaves a representation of old, and, perhaps, rejected opinions, to struggle with the opinions of the day.  Such collisions have invariably impeded the action and disturbed the harmony of our own government.  I would have every French elector vote for each senator; thus the local interests would be protected by the deputies, while the senate would strictly represent France.  This united action would control all things, and the ministry would be an emanation of their will, of which the king should merely be the organ.

I have no doubt the action of our own system would be better, could we devise some plan by which a ministry should supersede the present executive.  The project of Mr. Hillhouse, that of making the senators draw lots annually for the office of President, is, in my opinion, better than the elective system; but it would be, in a manner, liable to the old objection, of a want of harmony between the different branches of the government.  France has all the machinery of royalty, in her palaces, her parks, and the other appliances of the condition; and she has, moreover, the necessary habits and opinions, while we have neither.  There is, therefore, just as much reason why France should not reject this simple expedient for naming a ministry, as there is for our not adopting it.  Here, then, would be, at once, a “throne surrounded by republican institutions,” and, although it would not be a throne as powerful as that which France has at present, it would, I think, be more permanent than one surrounded by bayonets, and leave France, herself, more powerful, in the end.

The capital mistake made in 1830, was that of establishing the throne before establishing the republic; in trusting to men instead of trusting to institutions.

I do not tell you that Lafayette assented to all that I said.  He had reason for the impracticability of getting aside the personal interests which would be active in defeating such a reform, that involved details and a knowledge of character to which I had nothing to say; and, as respects the Duc de Bordeaux, he affirmed that the reign of the Bourbons was over in France.  The country was tired of them.  It may appear presumptuous in a foreigner to give an opinion against such high authority; but, “what can we reason but from what we know?” and truth