Let, therefore, innocent rewards be proposed, and let us be contented to lead on the ductile minds of children to a love of their duty, by obliging them with such:  we may tell them what we expect in this case; but we ought not, I humbly conceive, to be too rigorous in exacting it; for, after all, the inducement will naturally be the uppermost consideration with the child:  not, as I hinted, had it been offered to it, if the parent himself had not thought so.  And, therefore, we can only let the child know his duty in this respect, and that he ought to give a preference to that; and then rest ourselves contented, although we should discern, that the reward is the chief incentive, of it.  For this, from whatever motive inculcated, may beget a habit in the child of doing it:  and then, as it improves in years, one may hope, that reason will take place, and enable him, from the most solid and durable motives, to give a preference to the duty.

Upon the whole, then, can we insist upon it, that the child should so nicely distinguish away its little innate passions, as if we expected it to be born a philosopher?  Self-denial is, indeed, a most excellent doctrine to be inculcated into children, and it must be done early:  but we must not be too severe in our exacting it; for a duty too rigidly insisted upon, will make it odious.  This Mr. Locke, too, observes in another place, on the head of too great severity; which he illustrates by a familiar comparison:  “Offensive circumstances,” says he, “ordinarily infect innocent things which they are joined with.  And the very sight of a cup, wherein any one uses to take nauseous physic, turns his stomach; so that nothing will relish well out of it, though the cup be never so clean and well-shaped, and of the richest materials.”

Permit me to add, that Mr. Locke writes still more rigorously on the subject of rewards; which I quote, to shew I have not misunderstood him:  “But these enjoyments,” says he, “should never be offered or bestowed on children, as the rewards of this or that particular performance that they shew an aversion to, or to which they would not have applied themselves without that temptation.”  If, dear Sir, the minds of children can be led on by innocent inducements to the performance of a duty, of which they are capable, what I have humbly offered, is enough, I presume, to convince one, that it may be done.  But if ever a particular study be proposed to be mastered, or a bias to be overcome (that is not an indispensable requisite to his future life of morals) to which the child shews an aversion, I would not, methinks, have him be too much tempted or compelled to conquer or subdue it, especially if it appear to be a natural or rivetted aversion.  For, permit me to observe, that the education and studies of children ought, as much as possible, to be suited to their capacities and inclination, and, by these means, we may expect