the causes immediately succeeding which the effect comes into being, for the relation of movement with the collocating cause is incomprehensible.  Moreover if movement is defined as that which produces the effect, the very conception of causation which was required to be proved is taken for granted.  The idea of necessity involved in the causal conception that a cause is that which must produce its effect is also equally undefinable, inexplicable, and logically inconceivable.  Thus in whatsoever way we may seek to find out the real nature of the causal principle from the interminable series of cause-effect phenomena we fail.  All the characteristics of the effects are indescribable and indefinable ajnana of maya, and in whatever way we may try to conceive these phenomena in themselves or in relation to one another we fail, for they are all carved out of the indefinite and are illogical and illusory, and some day will vanish for ever.  The true cause is thus the pure being, the reality which is unshakable in itself, the ground upon

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which all appearances being imposed they appear as real.  The true cause is thus the unchangeable being which persists through all experience, and the effect-phenomena are but impositions upon it of ajnana or avidya.  It is thus the clay, the permanent, that is regarded as the cause of all clay-phenomena as jug, plates, etc.  All the various modes in which the clay appears are mere appearances, unreal, indefinable and so illusory.  The one truth is the clay.  So in all world-phenomena the one truth is being, the Brahman, and all the phenomena that are being imposed on it are but illusory forms and names.  This is what is called the satkaryavada or more properly the satkara@navada of the Vedanta, that the cause alone is true and ever existing, and phenomena in themselves are false.  There is only this much truth in them, that all are imposed on the reality or being which alone is true.  This appearance of the one cause the being, as the unreal many of the phenomena is what is called the vivarttavada as distinguished from the sa@mkhyayogapari@namavada, in which the effect is regarded as the real development of the cause in its potential state.  When the effect has a different kind of being from the cause it is called vivartta but when the effect has the same kind of being as the cause it is called pari@nama (kara@nasvalak@sa@nanyathabhava@h pari@nama@h tadvilak@sa@no vivartta@h or vastunastatsamattako’nyathabhava@h pari@nama@h tadvi@samasattaka@h vivartta@h).  Vedanta has as much to object against the Nyaya as against the pari@nama theory of causation of the Sa@mkhya; for movement, development, form, potentiality, and actuality—­all these are indefinable and inconceivable in the light of reason; they cannot explain causation but only restate things and phenomena as they appear in the world.  In reality however though phenomena are not identical with the cause, they can never be defined except in terms of the cause (Tadabhedam vinaiva tadvyatireke@na durvacam karyyam vivartta@h).