only seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except pure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason.  It has been proved that whatever notions we have about the objective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and false.  If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must show this character when exposed to discerning criticism.  All categories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to be without any conceivable notion that though apparent before us yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are

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examined, and one cannot make such assertion about them as that they are or that they are not.  Such negative criticisms of our fundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken by S’rihar@sa and his commentator and follower Citsukha.  It is impossible within the limits of this chapter, to give a complete account of their criticisms of our various notions of reality.  I shall give here, only one example.

Let us take the examination of the notion of difference (bheda)from Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhadya.  Four explanations are possible about the notion of difference:  (1) the difference may be perceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience (svarupa-bheda) as Prabhakara thinks; (2) the difference between two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other (anyonyabhava), as some Naiyayikas and Bha@t@tas think; (3) difference means divergence of characteristics (vaidharmya) as the Vais’e@sikas speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate quality in itself like the p@rthaktva quality of Nyaya.  Taking the first alternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth represent in themselves, by their very form and existence, their mutual difference from each other.  But if by perceiving the cloth we only perceive its difference from the jug as the characteristic of the cloth, then the jug also must have penetrated into the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive in the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug? i.e. if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by the senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference from something else, it is expected that something else such as jug, etc. from which the difference is perceived, must also be perceived directly in the perception of the cloth.  But if the perception of “difference” between two things has penetrated together in the same identical perception, then the self-contradiction becomes apparent.  Difference as an entity is not what we perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference from something else, and if that thing from which the difference is perceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as an entity be perceived?  If it is said that the cloth itself represents its difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug, then we may ask, what is the nature of the jug?  If the difference from the cloth is the very nature of the jug, then the cloth itself is also involved in the nature of the jug.  If it is said that