the v@rtti of anta@hkara@na, aha@mkara, may be regarded as only the active side or aspect of the anta@hkara@na.  The same anta@hkara@na is called manas in its capacity as doubt buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of knowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering [Footnote ref 2].  When the pure cit shines forth in association with this anta@hkara@na, it is called a jiva.  It is clear from the above account that the ajnana is not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena.  But it cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to support it (as’raya); its own nature as the ajnana or indefinite is perceived directly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originating the phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as underlying

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[Footnote 1:  See Nyayamakaranda, pp. 130-140, Citshkha and Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha, pp. 53-58.]

[Footnote 2:  See Vedanta-paribha@sa, p. 88, Bombay edition.]

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these phenomenal movements can only manifest itself through these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in the anta@hkara@na, and the light of the real shines forth through these states.  The anta@hkara@na of which aha@mkara is a moment, is itself a beginningless system of ajnana-phenomena containing within it the associations and impressions of past phenomena as merit, demerit, instincts, etc. from a beginningless time when the jiva or individual soul began his career.

Anirvacyavada and the Vedanta Dialectic.

We have already seen that the indefinite ajnana could be experienced in direct perception and according to Vedanta there are only two categories.  The category of the real, the self-luminous Brahman, and the category of the indefinite.  The latter has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all the diversity of the manifold world.  But this indefinite which is different from the category of the positive and the negative, has only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the true knowledge of the Brahman dawns.  Nothing however can be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character as indefinite.  That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names, all these are originated by this avidya, ajnana or maya is indeed hardly comprehensible.  If it is indefinite nescience, how can all these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it?  It is said to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existence beside the permanent infinite reality.  To take such a principle and to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly appeal to our reason.  If this system of world-order were