(ekenaiva sarvanugatena sarvatra satpratiti@h).  Things are not existent because they possess the genus of being (sat) as Nyaya supposes, but they are so because they are themselves but appearance imposed on one identical being as the basis and ground of all experience.  Being is thus said to be the basis (adhi@s@thana) on which the illusions appear.  This being is not different with different things but one in all appearances.  Our perceptions of the world-appearance could have been taken as a guarantee of their reality, if the reality which is supposed of them

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could be perceived by the senses, and if inference and s’ruti (scriptures) did not point the other way.  Perception can of course invalidate inference, but it can do so only when its own validity has been ascertained in an undoubted and uncontested manner.  But this is not the case with our perceptions of the world-appearance, for our present perceptions cannot prove that these will never be contradicted in future, and inference and s’ruti are also against it.  The mere fact that I perceive the world-appearance cannot prove that what I perceive is true or real, if it is contradicted by inference.  We all perceive the sun to be small, but our perception in this case is contradicted by inference and we have hence to admit that our perceptions are erroneous.  We depend (upajivya) indeed for all our transactions on perception, but such dependence cannot prove that that on which we depend is absolutely valid.  Validity or reality can only be ascertained by proper examination and enquiry (parik@sa), which may convince us that there is no error in it.  True it is that by the universal testimony of our contemporaries and by the practical fruition and realization of our endeavours in the external world, it is proved beyond doubt that the world-appearance before us is a reality.  But this sort of examination and enquiry cannot prove to us with any degree of satisfaction that the world-appearance will never be contradicted at any time or at any stage.  The Vedanta also admits that our examination and enquiry prove to us that the world-appearance now exists as it appears; it only denies that it cannot continue to exist for all times, and a time will come when to the emancipated person the world-appearance will cease to exist.  The experience, observation, and practical utility of the objects as perceived by us cannot prove to us that these will never be contradicted at any future time.  Our perception of the world-appearance cannot therefore disprove the Vedanta inference that the world-appearance is false, and it will demonstrate itself to be so at the time when the right knowledge of Brahman as one dawns in us.  The testimony of the Upani@sads also contradicts the perception which grasps the world-appearance in its manifold aspect.

Moreover we are led to think that the world-appearance is false, for it is not possible for us to discover any true relation between the consciousness (d@rk) and the objects of consciousness (d@rs’ya).  Consciousness must be admitted to have some kind of