when any new substances were produced, the qualities rushed forward and inhered in them.  It is very probable that in Nyaya the cultivation of the art of inference was originally pre-eminent and metaphysics was deduced later by an application of the inferential method which gave the introspective method but little scope for its application, so that inference came in to explain even perception (e.g. this is a jug since it has jugness) and the testimony of personal psychological experience was taken only as a supplement to corroborate the results arrived at by inference and was not used to criticize it [Footnote ref 1].

Sa@mkhya understood the difference between knowledge and material events.  But so far as knowledge consisted in being the copy of external things, it could not be absolutely different from the objects themselves; it was even then an invisible translucent sort of thing, devoid of weight and grossness such as the external objects possessed.  But the fact that it copies those gross objects makes it evident that knowledge had essentially the same substances though in a subtler form as that of which the objects were made.  But though the matter of knowledge, which assumed the form of the objects with which it came in touch, was probably thus a subtler combination of the same elementary substances of which matter was made up, yet there was in it another element, viz. intelligence, which at once distinguished it as utterly different from material combinations.  This element of intelligence is indeed different from the substances or content of the knowledge itself, for the element of intelligence is like a stationary light, “the self,” which illuminates the crowding, bustling knowledge which is incessantly changing its form in accordance with the objects with which it comes in touch.  This light of intelligence is the same that finds its manifestation in consciousness as the “I,” the changeless entity amidst all the fluctuations of the changeful procession of knowledge.  How this element of light which is foreign to the substance of knowledge

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[Footnote 1:  See Nyayamanjari on prama@na.]

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relates itself to knowledge, and how knowledge itself takes it up into itself and appears as conscious, is the most difficult point of the Sa@mkhya epistemology and metaphysics.  The substance of knowledge copies the external world, and this copy-shape of knowledge is again intelligized by the pure intelligence (puru@sa) when it appears as conscious.  The forming of the buddhi-shape of knowledge is thus the prama@na (instrument and process of knowledge) and the validity or invalidity of any of these shapes is criticized by the later shapes of knowledge and not by the external objects (svata@h-prama@nya and svata@h-aprama@nya).  The prama@na however can lead to a prama or right knowledge only when it is intelligized by the puru@sa.