him.  But I think that he pushes the interpretation too far on Kantian lines.  When I perceive “this is blue,” the perception consists of two parts, the actual presentative element of sense-knowledge (svalak@sa@na) and the affirmation (nis’caya).  So far we are in complete agreement.  But Professor Stcherbatsky says that this sense-knowledge is a k@sa@na (moment) and is nothing.  I also hold that it is a k@sa@na, but it is nothing only in the sense that it is not the same as the notion involving affirmation such as “this is blue.”  The affirmative process occurring at the succeeding moments is determined by the presentative element of the first moment (pratyak@sabalotpanna N.T., p. 20) but this presentative element divested from the product of the affirmative process of the succeeding moments is not characterless, though we cannot express its character; as soon as we try to express it, names and other ideas consisting of affirmation are associated and these did not form a part of the presentative element.  Its own character is said to be its own specific nature (svalak@sa@na).  But what is this specific nature?  Dharmakirtti’s answer on this point is that by specific nature he means those specific characteristics of the object which appear clear when the object is near and hazy when it is at a distance (yasyarthasya sannidhanasannidhanabkyam jnanapratibhasabhedastat svalak@sa@nam N., p. 1 and N.T., p. 16).  Sense-knowledge thus gives us the specific characteristics of the object, and this has the same form as the object itself; it is the appearance of the “blue” in its specific character in the mind and when this is associated by the affirmative or ideational process, the result is the concept or idea “this is blue” (nilasarupa@m pratyak@samanubhuyamana@m nilabodharupamavasthapyate ... nilasarupyamasya prama@nam nilavikalpanarupa@m tvasya prama@naphalam, N.T.p. 22).  At the first moment there is the appearance of the blue (nilanirbhasa@m hi vijnanam, N.T. 19) and this is direct acquaintance (yatkincit arthasya sak@satkarijnanam tatpratyak@samucyate, N.T. 7) and this is real (paramarthasat) and valid.  This blue sensation is different from the idea “this is blue” (nilabodha, N.T. 22) which is the result of the former (prama@naphala) through the association of the affirmative process (adhyavasaya) and is regarded as invalid for it contains elements other than what were presented to the sense and is a vikalpapratyaya.  In my opinion svalak@sa@na therefore means pure sensation of the moment presenting the specific features of the object and with Dharmakirtti this is the only thing which is valid in perception and vikalpapratyaya or pramanaphala is the idea or concept which follows it.  But though the latter is a product of the former, yet, being the construction of succeeding moments, it cannot give us the pure stage of the first moment of sensation-presentation (k@sa@nasya prapayitumas’akyatvat, N.T. 16).  N.T. = Nyayabindu@tika, N = Nyayabindu (Peterson’s edition).]