empty.  Thus he writes to me, “According to your interpretation svalak@sa@na mean,—­the object (or idea with Vijnanavadin) from which everything past and everything future has been eliminated, this I do not deny at all.  But I maintain that if everything past and future has been taken away, what remains? The present and the present is a k@sa@na i.e. nothing....  The reverse of k@sa@na is a k@sa@nasamtana or simply sa@mtana and in every sa@mtana there is a synthesis ekibhava of moments past and future, produced by the intellect (buddhi = nis’caya = kalpana = adhyavasaya)...There is in the perception of a jug something (a k@sa@na of sense knowledge) which we must distinguish from the idea of a jug (which is always a sa@mtana, always vikalpita), and if you take the idea away in a strict unconditional sense, no knowledge remains:  k@sanasya jnanena prapayitumas’akyatvat.  This is absolutely the Kantian teaching about Synthesis of Apprehension.  Accordingly pratyak@sa is a transcendental source of knowledge, because practically speaking it gives no knowledge at all.  This prama@na is asatkalpa.  Kant says that without the elements of intuition (= sense-knowledge = pratyak@sa = kalpanapo@dha) our cognitions would be empty and without the elements of intellect (kalpana = buddhi = synthesis = ekibhava) they would be blind.  Empirically both are always combined.  This is exactly the theory of Dharmakirtti.  He is a Vijnanavadi as I understand, because he maintains the cognizability of ideas (vijnana) alone, but the reality is an incognizable foundation of our knowledge; he admits, it is bahya, it is artha, it is arthakriyak@sa@na = svalak@sa@na; that is the reason for which he sometimes is called Sautrantika and this school is sometimes called Sautranta-vijnanavada, as opposed to the Vijnanavada of As’vagho@sa and Aryasanga, which had no elaborate theory of cognition.  If the jug as it exists in our representation were the svalak@sa@na and paramarthasat, what would remain of Vijnanavada?  But there is the perception of the jug as opposed to the pure idea of a jug (s’uddha kalpana), an element of reality, the sensational k@sa@na, which is communicated to us by sense knowledge.  Kant’s ‘thing in itself’ is also a k@sa@na and also an element of sense knowledge of pure sense as opposed to pure reason, Dharmakirtti has also s’uddha kalpana and s’uddham pratyak@sam. ...And very interesting is the opposition between pratyak@sa and anumana, the first moves from k@sa@na to sa@mtana and the second from sa@mtana to k@sa@na, that is the reason that although bhranta the anumana is nevertheless prama@na because through it we indirectly also reach k@sa@na, the arthakriyak@sa@na.  It is bhranta directly and prama@na indirectly; pratyak@sa is prama@na directly and bhranta (asatkalpa) indirectly... .”  So far as the passages to which Professor Stcherbatsky refers are concerned, I am in full agreement with