corroborates the inference of a separate entity as the vehicle of knowledge etc.  The objection is sometimes raised that if the soul is omnipresent how can it be called an agent or a mover?  But Mima@msa does not admit that movement means atomic motion, for the principle of movement is the energy which moves the atoms, and this is possessed by the omnipresent soul.  It is by the energy imparted by it to the body that the latter moves.  So it is that though the soul does not move it is called an agent on account of the fact that it causes the movement of the body.  The self must also be understood as being different from the senses, for even when one loses some of the senses he continues to perceive his self all the same as persisting all through.

The question now arises, how is self cognized?  Prabhakara holds that the self as cognizor is never cognized apart from the cognized object, nor is the object ever cognized without the cognizor entering into the cognition as a necessary factor.  Both the self and the object shine forth in the self-luminous knowledge in what we have already described as tripu@ti-pratyak@sa (perception as three-together).  It is not the soul which is self-illumined but knowledge; so it is knowledge which illumines both the self and the object in one operation.  But just as in the case of a man who walks, the action of walking rests upon the walker, yet he is regarded as the agent of the work and not as the object, so in the case of the operation of knowledge, though it affects the self, yet it appears as the agent and not as the object.  Cognition is not soul, but the soul is manifested in cognition as its substratum, and appears in it as the cognitive element “I” which is inseparable from all cognitions.  In deep sleep therefore when no object is cognized the self also is not cognized.

Kumarila however thinks that the soul which is distinct from the body is perceived by a mental perception (manasa-pratyak@sa as the substratum of the notion of “I,” or in other words the self perceives itself by mental perception, and the perception of its

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own nature shines forth in consciousness as the “I.”  The objection that the self cannot itself be both subject and object to its own operation does not hold, for it applies equally to Prabhakara’s theory in which knowledge reveals the self as its object and yet considers it as the subject of the operation.  The analogy of linguistic usage that though the walking affects the walker yet he is the agent, cannot be regarded as an escape from this charge, for the usage of language is not philosophical analysis.  Though at the time of the cognition of objects the self is cognized, yet it does not appear as the knower of the knowledge of objects, but reveals itself as an object of a separate mental perception which is distinct from the knowledge of objects.  The self is no doubt known as the substratum of “I,” but the knowledge of this self does not reveal itself