vanishes the moment it is uttered, but leaves behind an impression which combines with the impressions of the successively dying perceptions of letters, and this brings about the whole word which contains the potency of bringing about the comprehension of a certain meaning.  If even on hearing a word the meaning cannot be comprehended, it has to be admitted that the hearer lacks certain auxiliaries necessary for the purpose.  As the potency of the word originates from the separate potencies of the letters, it has to be admitted that the latter is the direct cause of verbal cognition.  Both Prabhakara and Kumarila agree on this point.

Another peculiar doctrine expounded here is that all words have natural denotative powers by which they themselves out of their own nature refer to certain objects irrespective of their comprehension or non-comprehension by the hearer.  The hearer will not understand the meaning unless it is known to him that the word in question is expressive of such and such a meaning, but the word was all along competent to denote that meaning and it is the hearer’s knowledge of that fact that helps him to

396

understand the meaning of a word.  Mimamsa does not think that the association of a particular meaning with a word is due to conventions among people who introduce and give meanings to the words [Footnote ref 1].  Words are thus acknowledged to be denotative of themselves.  It is only about proper names that convention is admitted to be the cause of denotation.  It is easy to see the bearing of this doctrine on the self-validity of the Vedic commandments, by the performance of which such results would arise as could not have been predicted by any other person.  Again all words are believed to be eternally existent; but though they are ever present some manifestive agency is required by which they are manifested to us.  This manifestive agency consists of the effort put forth by the man who pronounces the word.  Nyaya thinks that this effort of pronouncing is the cause that produces the word while Mimam@sa thinks that it only manifests to the hearer the ever-existing word.

The process by which according to Prabhakara the meanings of words are acquired maybe exemplified thus:  a senior commands a junior to bring a cow and to bind a horse, and the child on noticing the action of the junior in obedience to the senior’s commands comes to understand the meaning of “cow” and “horse.”  Thus according to him the meanings of words can only be known from words occurring in injunctive sentences; he deduces from this the conclusion that words must denote things only as related to the other factors of the injunction (anvitabhidhana vada), and no word can be comprehended as having any denotation when taken apart from such a sentence.  This doctrine holds that each word yields its meaning only as being generally related to other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence, thus the word gam accusative case