As regards the number of propositions necessary for the explicit statement of the process of inference for convincing others (pararthanumana) both Kumarila and Prabhakara hold that three premisses are quite sufficient for inference.  Thus the first three premisses pratijna, hetu and d@rstanta may quite serve the purpose of an anumana.

There are two kinds of anumana according to Kumarila viz. pratyak@satod@rstasambandha and samanyatod@r@s@tasambandha.  The former is that kind of inference where the permanent

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[Footnote 1:  Kumarila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance (vyapti) is ascertained only by the negative instances and not by the positive ones.]

[Footnote 2:  “tasmadanavagate’pi sarvatranvaye sarvatas’ca vyatireke bahus’ah sahityavagamamatradeva vyabhicaradars’anasanathadanuma
notpattira@ngikartavya@h.” Nyayaratnakara, p. 288.]

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relation between two concrete things, as in the case of smoke and fire, has been noticed.  The latter is that kind of inference where the permanent relation is observed not between two concrete things but between two general notions, as in the case of movement and change of place, e.g. the perceived cases where there is change of place there is also motion involved with it; so from the change of place of the sun its motion is inferred and it is held that this general notion is directly perceived like all universals [Footnote ref 1].

Prabhakara recognizes the need of forming the notion of the permanent relation, but he does not lay any stress on the fact that this permanent relation between two things (fire and smoke) is taken in connection with a third thing in which they both subsist.  He says that the notion of the permanent relation between two things is the main point, whereas in all other associations of time and place the things in which these two subsist together are taken only as adjuncts to qualify the two things (e.g. fire and smoke).  It is also necessary to recognize the fact that though the concomitance of smoke in fire is only conditional, the concomitance of the fire in smoke is unconditional and absolute [Footnote ref 2].  When such a conviction is firmly rooted in the mind that the concept of the presence of smoke involves the concept of the presence of fire, the inference of fire is made as soon as any smoke is seen.  Prabhakara counts separately the fallacies of the minor (pak@sabhasa), of the enunciation (pratijnabhasa) and of the example (d@r@s@tantabhasa) along with the fallacies of the middle and this seems to indicate that the Mima@msa logic was not altogether free from Buddhist influence.  The cognition of smoke includes within itself the cognition of fire also, and thus there would be nothing left unknown to be cognized by the inferential cognition.  But this objection has little force with Prabhakara, for he does not admit that a prama@na should necessarily bring us any new knowledge, for prama@na is simply defined as “apprehension.”  So though the inferential cognition always pertains to things already known it is yet regarded by him as a prama@na, since it is in any case no doubt an apprehension.