fiery mountain and not of fire.  Thus inference gives us a new knowledge, for though it was known in a general way that the possessor of smoke is the possessor of fire, yet the case of the mountain was not anticipated and the inference of the fiery mountain is thus a distinctly new knowledge (des’akaladhikyadyuktamag@rhitagrahitvam anumanasya, Nyayaratnakara, p. 363) [Footnote ref 1].  It should also be noted that in forming the notion of the permanent relation between two things, a third thing in which these two subsist is always remembered and for the conception of this permanent relation it is enough that in the large number of cases where the concomitance was noted there was no knowledge of any case where the concomitance failed, and it is not indispensable that the negative instances in which the absence of the gamya or vyapaka was marked by an

_______________________________________________________

_____________

[Footnote 1:  It is important to note that it is not unlikely that Kumarila was indebted to Di@nnaga for this; for Di@nnaga’s main contention is that “it is not fire, nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is the fiery hill that is inferred” for otherwise inference would give us no new knowledge see Vidyabhu@sa@na’s Indian Logic, p. 87 and Tatparya@tika, p. 120.]

389

absence of the gamaka or vyapya, should also be noted, for a knowledge of such a negative relation is not indispensable for the forming of the notion of the permanent relation [Footnote ref 1].  The experience of a large number of particular cases in which any two things were found to coexist together in another thing in some relation associated with the non-perception of any case of failure creates an expectancy in us of inferring the presence of the gamya in that thing in which the gamaka is perceived to exist in exactly the same relation [Footnote ref 2].  In those cases where the circle of the existence of the gamya coincides with the circle of the existence of the gamaka, each of them becomes a gamaka for the other.  It is clear that this form of inference not only includes all cases of cause and effect, of genus and species but also all cases of coexistence as well.

The question arises that if no inference is possible without a memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validity of inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not regarded as self-valid.  To this Kumarila’s answer is that memory is not invalid, but it has not the status of pramana, as it does not bring to us a new knowledge.  But inference involves the acquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coexistence of two things in another was known in a number of cases, yet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamya in a thing is known from the perception of the existence of the gamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is not perception, for it is only the gamaka that is seen and not the gamya.  If the gamya is also seen it is no inference at all.