The Prabhakara Mima@msa, in refuting the arguments of those who hold that our cognitions of objects are themselves cognized by some other cognition, says that this is not possible, since we do not experience any such double cognition and also because it would lead us to a regressus ad infinitum, for if a second cognition

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is necessary to interpret the first, then that would require a third and so on.  If a cognition could be the object of another cognition, then it could not be self-valid.  The cognition is not of course unknown to us, but that is of course because it is self-cognized, and reveals itself to us the moment it reveals its objects.  From the illumination of objects also we can infer the presence of this self-cognizing knowledge.  But it is only its presence that is inferred and not the cognition itself, for inference can only indicate the presence of an object and not in the form in which it can be apprehended by perception (pratyak@sa).  Prabhakara draws a subtle distinction between perceptuality (sa@mvedyatva) and being object of knowledge (prameyatva).  A thing can only be apprehended (sa@mvedyate) by perception, whereas inference can only indicate the presence of an object without apprehending the object itself.  Our cognition cannot be apprehended by any other cognition.  Inference can only indicate the presence or existence of knowledge but cannot apprehend the cognition itself [Footnote ref 1].

Kumarila also agrees with Prabhakara in holding that perception is never the object of another perception and that it ends in the direct apprehensibility of the object of perception.  But he says that every perception involves a relationship between the perceiver and the perceived, wherein the perceiver behaves as the agent whose activity in grasping the object is known as cognition.  This is indeed different from the Prabhakara view, that in one manifestation of knowledge the knower, the known, and the knowledge, are simultaneously illuminated (the doctrine of tripu@tipratyak@sa) [Footnote ref 2].

The Psychology of Illusion.

The question however arises that if all apprehensions are valid, how are we to account for illusory perceptions which cannot be regarded as valid?  The problem of illusory perception and its psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indian philosophy.  Omitting the theory of illusion of the Jains called satkhyati which we have described before, and of the Vedantists, which we shall describe in the next chapter, there are three different theories of illusion, viz. (1) atmakhyati, (2) viparitakhyati or anyathakhyati, and (3) akhyati of the Mima@msa school.  The

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[Footnote 1:  See Prabhakaramima@msa, by Dr Ga@nganatha Jha.]

[Footnote 2:  loc. cit. pp. 26-28.]