look at a thing that we call it a separate whole or only a conglomeration of parts.  In reality they are identical, but when we lay stress on the notion of parts, the thing appears to be a conglomeration of them, and when we look at it from the point of view of the unity appearing as a whole, the thing appears to be a whole of which there are parts (see S’lokavarttika, Vanavada) [Footnote ref 1].

Jati, though incorporating the idea of having many units within one, is different from the conception of whole in this, that it resides in its entirety in each individual constituting that jati (vyas’ajyav@rtti),

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[Footnote 1:  According to Sa@mkhya-Yoga a thing is regarded as the unity of the universal and the particular (samanyavis’esasamudayo dravyam, Vyasabhasya, III. 44), for there is no other separate entity which is different from them both in which they would inhere as Nyaya holds.  Conglomerations can be of two kinds, namely those in which the parts exist at a distance from one another (e.g. a forest), and those in which they exist close together (mrantara hi tadavayavah), and it is this latter combination (ayutasiddhavayava) which is called a dravya, but here also there is no separate whole distinct from the parts; it is the parts connected in a particular way and having no perceptible space between them that is called a thing or a whole.  The Buddhists as Panditas’oka has shown did not believe in any whole (avayavi), it is the atoms which in connection with one another appeared as a whole occupying space (paramanava eva hi pararupades’apariharenotpannah parasparasahita avabhasamana desavitanavanto bhavanti).  The whole is thus a mere appearance and not a reality (see Avayavinirakarana, Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts).  Nyaya however held that the atoms were partless (niravayava} and hence it would be wrong to say that when we see an object we see the atoms.  The existence of a whole as different from the parts which belong to it is directly experienced and there is no valid reason against it: 

   “adustakaranodbhutamanavirbhutabadhakam
   asandigdanca vijnanam katham mithyeti kathyate.”

Nyayamanjari, pp. 550 ff.]

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but the establishment of the existence of wholes refutes the argument that jati should be denied, because it involves the conception of a whole (class) consisting of many parts (individuals).  The class character or jati exists because it is distinctly perceived by us in the individuals included in any particular class.  It is eternal in the sense that it continues to exist in other individuals, even when one of the individuals ceases to exist.  When a new individual of that class (e g. cow class) comes into being, a new relation of inherence is generated by which the individual is brought into relation with the class-character existing