certain characteristic features in common with some other things; so we see that as other things are not presented to consciousness through memory, the percept at the indeterminate stage cannot be fully apprehended as an individual belonging to a class, though the data constituting the characteristic of the thing as a genus and its differentia are perceived at the indeterminate stage [Footnote ref 1].  So long as other things are not remembered these data cannot manifest themselves properly, and hence the perception of the thing remains indeterminate at the first stage of perception.  At the second stage the self by its past impressions brings the present perception in relation to past ones and realizes its character as involving universal and particular.  It is thus apparent that the difference between the indeterminate and the determinate perception is this, that in the latter case memory of other things creeps in, but this association of memory in the determinate perception refers to those other objects of memory and not to the percept.  It is also held that though the determinate perception is based upon the indeterminate one, yet since the former also apprehends certain such factors as did not enter into the indeterminate perception, it is to be regarded as a valid cognition.  Kumarila also agrees with Prabhakara in holding both the indeterminate and the determinate perception valid [Footnote ref 2].

Some Ontological Problems connected with the
Doctrine of Perception.

The perception of the class (jati) of a percept in relation to other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference between determinate and indeterminate perceptions.  The problems of jati and avayavavayavi (part and whole notion) were

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[Footnote 1:  Compare this with the Vais’e@sika view as interpreted by S’ridhara.]

[Footnote 2:  See Prakara@napancika and S’astradipika.]

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the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy.  Before entering into discussion about jati, Prabhakara first introduced the problem of avayava (part) and avayavi (whole).  He argues as an exponent of svata@h-prama@nyavada that the proof of the true existence of anything must ultimately rest on our own consciousness, and what is distinctly recognized in consciousness must be admitted to have its existence established.  Following this canon Prabhakara says that gross objects as a whole exist, since they are so perceived.  The subtle atoms are the material cause and their connection (sa@myoga) is the immaterial cause (asamavayikara@na), and it is the latter which renders the whole altogether different from the parts of which it is composed; and it is not necessary that all the parts should be perceived before the whole is perceived.  Kumarila holds that it is due to the point of view from which we