or common (e.g. the mountain is fiery because it is an object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fire is also an object of knowledge), (2) asadhara@na or too restricted (e.g. sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound; this cannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in the sound and nowhere else), and (3) anupasa@mharin or unsubsuming (e.g. everything is non-eternal, because they are all objects of knowledge; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can be found which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite conclusion may also be drawn).  The fallacy satpratipak@sa is that in which there is a contrary reason which may prove the opposite conclusion (e.g. sound is eternal because it is audible, sound is non-eternal because it is an effect).  The fallacy asiddha (unreal) is of three kinds (i) as’rayasiddha (the lotus of the sky is fragrant because it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus in the sky), (2) svarupasiddha (sound is a quality because it is visible; but sound has no visibility), (3) vyapyatvasiddha is that where the concomitance between the middle and the consequence is not invariable and inevitable; there is smoke in the hill because there is fire; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a red hot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably associated with smoke.  The fallacy badhita is that which pretends to prove a thesis which is against direct experience, e.g. fire is not hot because it is a substance.  We have already enumerated the fallacies counted by Vais’e@sika.  Contrary to Nyaya practice

362

Pras’astapada counts the fallacies of the example.  Di@nnaga also counted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms; but atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmakirtti counted also the fallacies of the pak@sa (minor); but Nyaya rightly considers that the fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguard inference and that these are mere repetitions.  Chala means the intentional misinterpretation of the opponent’s arguments for the purpose of defeating him.  Jati consists in the drawing of contradictory conclusions, the raising of false issues or the like with the deliberate intention of defeating an opponent.  Nigrahasthana means the exposure of the opponent’s argument as involving self-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat is conclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious opponent.  As to the utility of the description of so many debating tricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical work, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to emancipation, it is said by Jayanta in his Nyayamanjari that these had to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant disputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before