a distinct category.  If some difference is noted between the ground with the jug, and the ground without it, then call it “ground, without the jugness” or “the negation of jug,” it does not matter much, for a distinct category has anyhow been admitted.  Negation is apprehended by perception as much as any positive existent is; the nature of the objects of perception only are different; just as even in the perception of positive sense-objects there are such diversities as colour, taste, etc.  The relation of negation with space and time with which it appears associated is the relation that subsists between the qualified and the quality (vis’e@sya vis’e@sa@na).  The relation between the negation and its pratiyogi is one of opposition, in the sense that where the one is the other is not.  The Vais’e@sika sutra (IX. i. 6) seems to take abhava in a similar way as Kumarila the Mima@msist does, though the commentators have tried to explain it away [Footnote ref 2].  In Vais’e@sika the four kinds of negation are enumerated as (1) pragabhava (the negation preceding the production of an object—­e.g. of the jug before it is made by the potter); (2) dhva@msabhava (the negation following the destruction of an object—­as of the jug after it is destroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3) anyonyabhava (mutual negation—­e.g. in the cow there is the negation of the horse and

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[Footnote 1:  See Nyayabindu@tika, pp. 34 ff., and also Nyayamanjari, pp. 48-63.]

[Footnote 2 Pras’astapada says that as the production of an effect is the sign of the existence of the cause, so the non-production of it is the sign of its non-existence, S’ridbara in commenting upon it says that the non-preception of a sensible object is the sign (li@nga) of its non-existence.  But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for he says that non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses (bhavavad abhavo’pindriyagraha@nayogyah) and that there is an actual sense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of the preception of non-existence (abhavendriyasannikar@so’pi abhavagraha@nasamagri), Nyayakandali_, pp. 225-30.]

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in the horse that of the cow); (4) atyantabhava (a negation which always exists—­e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in other places is not destroyed) [Footnote ref 1].

The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for the seeker of Salvation.

It is probable that the Nyaya philosophy arose in an atmosphere of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy.  These are tarka, nir@naya, vada, jalpa, vita@n@da, hetvabhasa, chala, jati and nigrahasthana.