and it cannot be related to this or that particular negation.  There are however many kinds of non-perception, e.g. (1) svabhavanupalabdhi (natural non-perception—­there is no jug because none is perceived); (2) kara@nanupalabdhi (non-perception of cause—­there is no smoke here, since there is no fire); (3) vyapakanupalabdhi (non-perception of the species—­there is no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) karyanupalabdhi (non-perception of effects—­there are not the causes of smoke here, since there is no smoke); (5) svabhavaviruddhopalabdhi (perception of contradictory natures—­there is no cold touch here because of fire); (6) viruddhakaryopalabdhi (perception of contradictory effects—­there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7) virudhavyaptopalabdhi (opposite concomitance—­past is not of necessity destructible, since it depends on other causes); (8) karyyaviruddhopalabdhi (opposition of effects—­there is not here the causes which can give cold since there is fire); (9) vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi (opposite concomitants—­there is no touch of snow here, because of fire); (10) kara@naviruddhopalabdhi (opposite causes—­there is no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire); (11) kara@naviruddhakaryyopalabdhi (effects of opposite causes—­this place is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for it is full of smoke [Footnote ref 1]).

There is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of negation, but that does not prove that there is any reason for the cognition of negation (heturnabhavasamvida@h).  All that we can say is this that there are certain situations which justify the use (yogyata) of negative appellations.  But this situation or yogyata is positive in character.  What we all speak of in ordinary usage as non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort.  Perception of negation thus does not prove the existence of negation, but only shows that there are certain positive perceptions which are only interpreted in that way.  It is the positive perception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that

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[Footnote 1:  See Nyayabindu, p. 11, and Nyayamanjari, pp. 53-7.]

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leads us to speak of having perceived the negation of the jug (anupalambha@h abhava@m vyavaharayati) [Footnote ref 1].

The Nyaya reply against this is that the perception of positive existents is as much a fact as the perception of negation, and we have no right to say that the former alone is valid.  It is said that the non-perception of jug on the ground is but the perception of the ground without the jug.  But is this being without the jug identical with the ground or different?  If identical then it is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it even when the jug is there.  If different then the quarrel is only over the name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted to be