that should be regarded as leading to inference.  His answer is that both these lead to inference, but that which immediately leads to inference is li@ngaparamars’a, i.e. the present perception of the middle in the minor associated with the memory of its connection with the major, for inference does not immediately follow the memory of the connection, but the present perception of the middle associated with the memory of the connection (sm@rtyanug@rhito li@ngaparamars’o).  But he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance.  Udyotakara’s criticisms of Di@nnaga as shown by Vacaspati have no reference to this point The doctrine of tadatmya and tadutpatti was therefore in all probability a new contribution to Buddhist logic by Dharmakirtti.  Dharmakirtti’s contention was that the root principle of the connection between the middle and the major was that the former was either identical in essence with the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped a mere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us

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[Footnote 1:  Pras’astapada’s bha@sya with Nyayakandali, pp. 200-255.]

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the desired connection [Footnote ref 1].  Vacaspati in his refutation of this view says that the cause-effect relation cannot be determined as a separate relation.  If causality means invariable immediate antecedence such that there being fire there is smoke and there being no fire there is no smoke, then it cannot be ascertained with perfect satisfaction, for there is no proof that in each case the smoke was caused by fire and not by an invisible demon.  Unless it can be ascertained that there was no invisible element associated, it cannot be said that the smoke was immediately preceded by fire and fire alone.  Again accepting for the sake of argument that causality can be determined, then also cause is known to precede the effect and therefore the perception of smoke can only lead us to infer the presence of fire at a preceding time and not contemporaneously with it.  Moreover there are many cases where inference is possible, but there is no relation of cause and effect or of identity of essence (e.g. the sunrise of this morning by the sunrise of yesterday morning).  In the case of identity of essence (tadatmya as in the case of the pine and the tree) also there cannot be any inference, for one thing has to be inferred by another, but if they are identical there cannot be any inference.  The nature of concomitance therefore cannot be described in either of these ways.  Some things (e.g. smoke) are naturally connected with some other things (e.g. fire) and when such is the case, though we may not know any further about the nature of this connection, we may infer the latter from the former and not vice versa, for fire is connected with smoke only under certain conditions (e.g. green wood).  It may be