these premisses excepting the second “apades’a.”  Pratijna is of course the same as we have in Nyaya, and the term nidars’ana is very similar to Nyaya d@r@s@tanta, but the last two are entirely different.  Nidars’ana may be of two kinds, (1) agreement in presence (e.g. that which has motion is a substance as is seen in the case of an arrow), (2) agreement in absence (e.g. what is not a substance has no motion as is seen in the case of the universal being [Footnote ref l]).  He also points out cases of the fallacy of the example

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{Footnote 1:  Dr Vidyabhu@sa@na says that “An example before the time of Dignaga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the understanding of the listener, e.g.  The hill is fiery; because it has smoke; like a kitchen (example).  Asa@nga made the example more serviceable to reasoning, but Dignaga converted it into a universal proposition, that is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term, e.g.  The hill is fiery; because it has smoke; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen” (Indian Logic, pp. 95, 96).  It is of course true that Vatsyayana had an imperfect example as “like a kitchen” (s’abda@h utpatvidharmakatvadanuya@h sthalyadivat, I.i. 36), but Pras’astapada has it in the proper form.  Whether Pras’astapada borrowed it from Dig@nnaga or Dig@nnaga from Pras’astapada cannot be easily settled.]

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(nidars’anabhasa).  Pras’astapada’s contribution thus seems to consist of the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy of the nidars’ana, but the names of the last two premisses are so different from what are current in other systems that it is reasonable to suppose that he collected them from some other traditional Vais’e@sika work which is now lost to us.  It however definitely indicates that the study of the problem of inference was being pursued in Vais’e@sika circles independently of Nyaya.  There is no reason however to suppose that Pras’astapada borrowed anything from Di@nnaga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes, for, as I have shown above, most of Pras’astapada’s apparent innovations are all definitely alluded to by Ka@nada himself, and Professor Keith has not discussed this alternative.  On the question of the fallacies of nidars’ana, unless it is definitely proved that Di@nnaga preceded Pras’astapada, there is no reason whatever to suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former [Footnote ref 1].

The nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the most important part of inference.  Vatsyayana says that an inference can be made by the sight of the li@nga (reason or middle) through the memory of the connection between the middle and the major previously perceived.  Udyotakara raises the question whether it is the present perception of the middle or the memory of the connection of the middle with the major