first fallacy is a combination of pak@sasattva and sapak@sasattva, for not only the present pak@sa (the ass) had no horns, but no horses had any horns, and the second is a case of vipak@sasattva, for those which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns.  Thus, it seems that when Pras’astapada says that he is giving us the view of Ka@nada he is faithful to it.  Pras’astapada says that wherever there is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke.  When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the smoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that there is fire.  But with regard to Ka@nada’s enumeration of types of inference such as “a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect from the cause,” etc., Pras’astapada holds that these are not the only types of inference, but are only some examples for showing the general nature of inference.  Inference merely shows a connection such that from this that can be inferred.  He then divides inference into two classes, d@r@s@ta (from the experienced characteristics of one member of a class to another member of the same class), and samanyato d@r@s@ta.  D@r@s@ta (perceived resemblance) is that where the previously known case and the inferred case is exactly of the same class.  Thus as an example of it we can point out that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass of flesh on its neck (sasna), I can whenever I see the same hanging

350

mass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow.  But when on the strength of a common quality the inference is extended to a different class of objects, it is called samanyato d@r@s@ta.  Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded with a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests, namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with the objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of heaven).  When the conclusion, to which one has arrived (svanis’citartha) is expressed in five premisses for convincing others who are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then the inference is called pararthanumana.  We know that the distinction of svarthanumana (inference for oneself) and pararthanumana (inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists.  Pras’astapada does not make a sharp distinction of two classes of inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be conveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is called pararthanumana.  But this need not be considered as an entirely new innovation of Pras’astapada, for in IX. 2, Ka@nada himself definitely alludes to this distinction (asyeda@m karyyakara@nasambandhas’cavayavadbhavati).  The five premisses which are called in Nyaya pratijna, hetu d@r@s@tanta, upanaya, and nigamana are called in Vais’e@sika pratijna, apades’a, nidars’ana, anusandhana, and pratyamnaya.  Ka@nada however does not mention the name of any of