of concomitance (
vyapti} between the ass and
the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. But of course it
might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by the
above observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be
a real hetu, and there might be some other condition
(
upadhi) associated with the hetu which was
the real hetu. Thus we know that fire in green
wood (
ardrendhana) produced smoke, but one might
doubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that
produced smoke, but there was some hidden demon who
did it. But there would be no end of such doubts,
and if we indulged in them, all our work endeavour
and practical activities would have to be dispensed
with (
vyaghata). Thus such doubts as lead
us to the suspension of all work should not disturb
or unsettle the notion of vyapti or concomitance at
which we had arrived by careful observation and consideration
[Footnote ref 2]. The Buddhists and the naiyayikas
generally agreed as to the method of forming the notion
of concomitance or vyapti (
vyaptigraha), but
the former tried to assert that the validity of such
a concomitance always depended on a relation of cause
and effect or of identity of essence, whereas Nyaya
held that neither the relations of cause and effect,
nor that of essential identity of genus and species,
exhausted the field of inference, and there was quite
a number of other types of inference which could not
be brought under either of them (e.g. the rise of
the moon and the tide of the ocean). A natural
fixed order that certain things happening other things
would happen could certainly exist, even without the
supposition of an identity of essence.
But sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes
often have the same kind of effect, and in such cases
it is difficult to
_______________________________________________________
____________
[Footnote 1: See Tatparya@tika on anumana
and vyaptigraha.]
[Footnote 2: Tatparya@tika on vyaptigraha,
and Tattvacintama@ni of Ga@nges’a on
vyaptigraha.]
348
infer the particular cause from the effect. Nyaya
holds however that though different causes are often
found to produce the same effect, yet there must be
some difference between one effect and another.
If each effect is taken by itself with its other attendant
circumstances and peculiarities, it will be found
that it may then be possible to distinguish it from
similar other effects. Thus a flood in the street
may be due either to a heavy downpour of rain immediately
before, or to the rise in the water of the river close
by, but if observed carefully the flooding of the
street due to rain will be found to have such special
traits that it could be distinguished from a similar
flooding due to the rise of water in the river.
Thus from the flooding of the street of a special
type, as demonstrated by its other attendant circumstances,
the special manner in which the water flows by small