A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 756 pages of information about A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1.

A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 756 pages of information about A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1.
associated with the memory of its concomitance with fire (t@rtiya-li@nga-paramars’a) is thus the cause (anumitikara@na_ or anumana) of the inference (anumiti).  The concomitance of smoke with fire is technically called vyapti. When this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with those having fire, it is called bahirvyapti; and when it refers to the conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any relation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was observed, it is called antarvyapti. The Buddhists since they did not admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred antarvyapti view of concomitance to bahirvyapti as a means of inference [Footnote ref 1].

Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference will depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign (hetu) with the signate (sadhya), how are we to assure ourselves in each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (vyaptigraha) had been correct, and the observation of concomitance had been valid.  The Mima@msa school held, as we shall see in the next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases I knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there was fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire.  But Nyaya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any smoke, i.e. not only every case of the existence of smoke should be a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fire should be a case of absence of smoke.  The former is technically called anvayavyapti and the latter vyatirekavyapti. But even this is not enough.  Thus there may have been an ass sitting, in a hundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might have been a hundred cases where there was neither ass nor smoke, but it cannot be asserted from it that there is any relation of concomitance,

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[Footnote 1:  See Antarvyaptisamarthana, by Ratnakaras’anti in the Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, Bibliotheca Indica, 1910.]

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or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke.  It may be that one might never have observed smoke without an antecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but even that is not enough.  If it were such that we had so experienced in a very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass produced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents remained the same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately followed by the disappearance of smoke (yasmin sati bhavanam yato vina na bhavanam iti bhuyodars’ana@m, Nyayamanjari, p. 122), then only could we say that there was any relation

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A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.