The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against inference by the Carvakas, that inferential arguments are valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity of nature in two relations, viz. tadatmya (essential identity) and tadutpatti (succession in a relation of cause and effect).  Tadatmya is a relation of genus and species and not of causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity (tadatmya).  The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.

Nyaya holds that inference is made because of the invariable association (niyama) of the li@nga or hetu (the concomitance of which with the sadhya has been safeguarded by the five conditions noted above) with the sadhya, and not because of such specific relations as tadatmya or tadutpatti.  If it is held that the inference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the essential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argument that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well; for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both ways.  If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a pine are associated with those of a tree and not those of a tree with those of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essential identity, but to the invariable association of the li@nga (mark) with the li@ngin (the possessor of li@nga), otherwise called niyama.  The argument from tadutpatti (association as cause and effect) is also really due to invariable association, for it explains the case of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of other types of inference, where the association as cause and effect is not available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is inferred).  Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the li@nga with the li@ngin, as safeguarded by the conditions noted above, is what leads us to make a valid inference [Footnote ref l].

We perceived in many cases that a li@nga (e.g. smoke) was associated with a li@ngin (fire), and had thence formed the notion

_______________________________________________________

____________

[Footnote 1:  See Nyayamanjari on anumana.]

346

that wherever there was smoke there was fire.  Now when we perceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we remembered the concomitance (vyapti) of smoke and fire which we had observed before, and then since there was smoke in the hill, which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we concluded that there was fire in the hill.  The discovery of the li@nga (smoke) in the hill as