and this may happen to be true.  This is called pratibhanajnana, which is also to be regarded as a pratyak@sa directly by the mind.  This is of course different from the other form of perception called manasa-pratyak@sa, by which memories of past perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept visualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and perceive that it is fragrant; the fragrance is not perceived by the eye, but the manas perceives it directly and associates the visual percept with it.  According to Vedanta this acquired perception is only a case of inference.  The pratibha-pratyak@sa however is that which is with reference to the happening of a future event.  When a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective cognition, e.g.  This is a pot, but after this it is again related to the self by the mind as “I know this pot.”  This is effected by the mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cognition which had already been generated in the soul.  This second reperception is called anuvyavasaya, and all practical work can proceed as a result of this anuvyavasaya [Footnote ref. l].

Inference.

Inference (anumana) is the second means of proof (prama@na) and the most valuable contribution that Nyaya has made has been on this subject.  It consists in making an assertion about a thing on the strength of the mark or linga which is associated with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire in yonder hill.  In an example like this smoke is technically called linga, or hetu.  That about which the assertion has been made (the hill in this example) is called pak@sa, and the term “fire” is called sadhya.  To make a correct inference it is necessary that the hetu or linga must be present in the pak@sa,

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[Footnote 1:  This later Nyaya doctrine that the cognition of self in association with cognition is produced at a later moment must be contrasted with the triputipratyak@sa doctrine of Prabhakara, which holds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simultaneously in knowledge.  Vyavasaya (determinate cognition), according to Ga@nges’a, gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am aware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding the former one and is called anu (after) vyavasaya (cognition), “idamaha@m janamiti vyavasaye na bhasate taddhakendriyasannikar@sabhavat kintvida@mvi@sayakajnanatvavis’i@s@tasya jnanasya vais’i@styamatmani bhasate; na ca svaprakas’e vyavasaya tad@rs’a@m svasya vais’i@s@tya@m bhasitumarhati, purva@m vis’e@sa@nasya tasyajnanat, tasmadidamaha@m janamiti na vyavasaya@h kintu anuvyavasayah.” Tattvacintama@ni_, p. 795.]

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